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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the manner in which Israeli courts "talk" about sexual
harassment and conceptualize its harm. Based on a thorough analysis of
contemporary sexual harassment caselaw in Israel, it presents the first
systematic study of all reported court opinions on sexual harassment that have
been issued following the enactment of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment
Law in 1998.
From a global perspective, Israeli sexual harassment law provides both an
intriguing example of an effort to use the law as a tool for social change and a
realization of contemporary doctrinal and normative challenges to sexual
harassment law in the United States and in Europe. The recent sexual
harassment legislation in Israel was inspired and promoted by feminist activists
and academics, whose cooperation with members of the Knesset (the Israeli
Parliament) and with attorneys at the Ministry of Justice facilitated the
successful enactment of the law in 1998. In this regard, this law and its
subsequent interpretation and application present an important example of
feminist lawmaking in action and of its actual impact on women's lives. In
addition, feminist proponents of the Israeli legislation aspired to offer a new
conceptualization of sexual harassment, in comparison to the American
example. Their goal was to carefully examine U.S. sexual harassment law, to
identify its drawbacks, and to devise a new and better formulation for the
Israeli context in light of the unique features of Israeli society and law. One
major implication of this feminist effort to improve the traditional legal
framework of sexual harassment law was the reconceptualization of this social
phenomenon primarily as a dignitary harm. Instead of associating sexual
harassment exclusively with sex-based discrimination, as is prevalent in the
United States, the new Israeli law proclaims that sexual harassment violates,
first and foremost, human dignity. Along with liberty and privacy, the law
refers to equality between the sexes as an alternative rather than exclusive
social value that is relevant to understanding the underlying wrongs inherent in
sexual harassment. 1
Taking into consideration those two aspects of the Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law in Israel, this Article explores the various consequences of the
Law's dignitary paradigm in terms of its potential implications for women's
image and status in society. More specifically, this Article examines whether
Israeli law has fulfilled its promise to promote a more progressive discourse on
sexual harassment, and what lessons can be learned from this contemporary
1. Section 1 provides: "The objective of this Law is to prohibit sexual harassment, in order to
protect human dignity, liberty and privacy and in order to promote equality between the sexes."
Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1998, S.H. 166 § 1. (Editors' note: All translations from Hebrew
are by the author unless otherwise noted.]
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feminist effort to correct some of the major drawbacks of American sexual
harassment doctrine.
Part I of this Article traces the origins of the dignity-based challenge to
sexual harassment law and explains the broader context in which the dignitary
paradigm of the Israeli legislation can be understood and evaluated. In this Part
I explain that European legislatures were the first to draw a conceptual link
between dignity and sexual harassment in the late 1980s. Following the
European example, and due to a growing dissatisfaction with the existing state
of sexual harassment doctrine, a few American feminists introduced this idea
into their writing on sexual harassment and provided a newly-elaborated
theoretical defense of the reconceptualization of the harms of sexual
harassment in terms of dignity and respect.
In the United States, this dignity-based challenge to sexual harassment law
remained purely theoretical. Israeli feminists, on the other hand, succeeded in
promoting legislation that explicitly referred to the violation of human dignity
as the primary harm associated with sexual harassment. Thus, with the
enactment of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, an idea that some
American scholars were discussing on the theoretical level became a legal
reality in Israel.
Part II explores the legislative history of Israel's Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law. Here I outline the specific arguments that Israeli feminists
raised in favor of a new conceptualization of sexual harassment, and underscore
the manner in which those arguments eventually shaped the dignity-based
aspects of the new legislation. Yet, while the feminist decision to place dignity
as the central value that defines the harm of sexual harassment was well
thought-out, in this Part I also highlight some of the normative complexities
inherent to the term 'dignity' in Hebrew that were disregarded in the drafting
process of the new legislation.
Part III provides a thorough analysis of Israeli caselaw since the enactment
of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, and outlines the manner in which
courts refer to sexual harassment and explain its harms. Specifically, this Part
identifies four problematic themes that arise out of the dignity-based paradigm
of contemporary sexual harassment caselaw in Israel. First, in the analysis of
sexual harassment and its harms, this caselaw prioritizes dignity over equality
so much so that the discriminatory aspects of this social practice are no longer
part of the legal discourse. Thus, despite the fact that the legislation formally
mentions equality as an additional value that is potentially relevant for the
analysis of sexual harassment, contemporary judicial discourse focuses
exclusively on dignity and explains the harm of sexual harassment solely in
dignitary terms. Second, in some cases, courts present the dignitary harm of
sexual harassment in gender-neutral and individual terms even though the
various cases bear an unmistakably gendered significance. In the vast majority
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of sexual harassment cases I examined the following conditions were present:
The harasser was a man, the target was a woman (or several women in the same
setting),2 and the harassment occurred in the broader context of unequal
gendered power relations in the public sphere and the workplace. Nonetheless,
courts discuss these gender-based incidents of sexual harassment in gender-
neutral and individual terms, using language that indicates that one person has
violated another person's dignity. This discourse disguises the gendered nature
of sexual harassment and its particular harm to women and portrays it in
misleadingly neutral terms. Third, in another set of cases, courts divert the
dignitary frame of analysis and engage in a gendered discussion of the harm of
sexual harassment. These cases acknowledge the gendered and group aspects of
the phenomenon, but do so in moralistic and patriarchal terms that reinforce
stereotypes of women and Victorian conceptions of women's honor. As part of
this line of analysis, courts associate sexual harassment with the violation of
women's honor and refer to the need to protect women from crude sexual
behavior as the main purpose of the law. An underlying assumption that
emerges out of this discourse is that the very exposure of women to various
sexual behaviors is the central wrong of sexual harassment. Women are then
stereotyped as fragile, sexually pure, and in need of a special protection.
Finally, in the majority of cases I examined the dignitary paradigm of sexual
harassment is explicitly correlated with sexual behaviors. Courts focus on the
"sexual" in sexual harassment, thereby legitimating other forms of sex-based
harassment that working women often experience.
Part IV raises some possible explanations for these current features of
sexual harassment caselaw in Israel and argues that they appear to be the
product of three crucial choices that the legislation's drafters made. The first
was the very decision to list gender equality as one of several values including
human dignity, liberty, and privacy that were declared relevant for the analysis
of sexual harassment. The second decision that immediately followed was to
award a special and primary role within this complex assembly of values to
dignity as the central normative frame of reference for the definition of the
wrong of sexual harassment. The third choice was the decision to criminalize
sexual harassment and within the criminal context to associate this social
practice with other sex offenses, such as "indecent behavior."
My final conclusion is that the dignity-based paradigm of sexual
harassment as implemented by Israel's new legislation has led to outcomes that
2. Out of a total of 222 reported court opinions that I identified and examined, only three involved
men as targets of harassment. In two of those cases the victims of harassment were vulnerable or less
powerful men who did not conform to stereotypical patterns of masculinity because of sexual identity or
age. One case involved a gay complainant, SC (Jer) 2272/05 Malea v. Ovsfeld Co. [2005] Pador 05(23)
99, and the second involved the harassment of several minors, CrimA 6644/06 Kraus v. Israel [2006]
Pador 06(20) 331. The third case concerned harassment of a male worker by a fellow co-worker but was
very brief in details so it was impossible to determine if it had a broader gendered significance. CrimC
(Jer) 4399/01 Israel v. Barashi [2003] (non-paginated).
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are contrary to the goals of those who fought for it. Despite the fact that the
enactment of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law brought about a
marked rise in the number of court opinions dealing with sexual harassment,
the battle that Israeli courts currently wage against sexual harassment is
typically based on causes that are distant from what feminist proponents of the
new legislation had in mind. Instead of becoming an educational,
consciousness-raising tool that marks a new era in the awareness of sexual
harassment among the Israeli public, sexual harassment law has achieved quite
the opposite; it has hindered the broader and more radical task that the feminist
forces who initiated the new law envisioned. Hence, for feminists, as for all
other advocates of the dignitary paradigm of sexual harassment, the Prevention
of Sexual Harassment Law provides a cautionary tale of the difficulties
inherent in efforts to use the law as a bridge between radical agendas and
existing social norms.
I. THE ORIGIN AND SUBSTANCE OF THE DIGNITARY CHALLENGE TO SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Israel's Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law is not unique in its
definition of the harm of sexual harassment in primarily dignitary terms.
Formal legal references to sexual harassment as a dignitary harm originated in
Europe as early as the 1980s.3 While American courts embraced the notion that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination a few years earlier,4 and
inspired the initial European reference to sexual harassment as a legal wrong,
5
European sexual harassment law revolved around concepts of dignity early on.6
As Europe began to address sexual harassment on a community level, one
of the first measures it adopted was the 1984 European Community Council
Recommendation, which referred to sexual harassment as a major problem
affecting the dignity and rights of women. 7 A subsequent resolution in 1990 on
the Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work similarly placed a
3. Susanne Baer, Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harassment in European, German,
and U.S. Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 582 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2003); Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1262-64
(1994).
4. The first appellate court decision holding that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The United States Supreme Court affirmed this notion almost a decade later in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
5. Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1234-39; Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European
Transformation of Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 245
(2003).
6. Friedman & Whitman, supra note 5, at 245.
7. See Council Recommendation No. 84/635 of 13 Dec. 1984, 1984 O.J. (L 331) 34 (on the
promotion of positive action for women).
8. Council Resolution of 29 May 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 157) 3, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work). This second
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particular focus on the dignitary aspects of this social practice and led to an
official recommendation by the Commission of the European Community that
adopted the same frame of reference for sexual harassment a year later. 9 In
2000, two directives of the European Community Council supplemented this
emphasis on dignity with a formal definition of workplace harassment as
discrimination. However, when these Community measures were
implemented by specific legislation in various member states of the European
Community, especially in continental Europe, many adopted only the dignitary
paradigm of sexual harassment without including or attributing similar weight
to its companion discriminatory harm. 1 German law, for instance, defines
sexual harassment as an intentional activity of a sexual nature that is at least in
part recognizably rejected or proven unwelcome and that violates the dignity of
individuals at work. 12 Furthermore, some countries, such as France, have
specifically rejected efforts to associate sexual harassment with discrimination,
and have ultimately adopted laws that expressly avoid any reference to gender
equality in the context of sexual harassment.'
3
This focus on dignity rather than equality in continental Europe is usually
attributed to two major factors. First, some commentators argue that doctrinal
resolution was adopted as a result of a 1988 report of the Commission of the European Community on
"The Dignity of Women at Work," which concluded that there were still almost no legal initiatives
relating to sexual harassment among member states. See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1237-38.
9. Commission Recommendation 92/131/EEC of 27 November 1991, 1992 O.J. (L 49), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work). The
relevant section reads:
Whereas unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, or other conduct based on sex affecting the
dignity of women and men at work, including the conduct of superiors and colleagues, is
unacceptable and may, in certain circumstances be contrary to the principle of equal
treatment within the meaning of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9
February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women
as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working
conditions ....
Id. A Commission recommendation does not bind member states or their citizens. Nevertheless, national
courts within the European Community are obliged to take recommendations into account when
adjudicating disputes. See Case 322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Profcssionnelles, 1989 E.C.R.
4407,4421.
10. This principle was articulated in two directives that were based on section 13 of the European
Treaty: Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22 (implementing the
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin); and Council
Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation).
11. For a detailed summary of dignity-based legislative initiatives in the area of harassment law
across Europe, see Brady Coleman, Pragmatism 's Insult: The Growing Interdisciplinary Challenge to
American Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 239, 260-65 (2004). Sexual
harassment as sex discrimination has taken hold in British caselaw and has achieved partial endorsement
at the Community level and in scattered areas around the continent. See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1243-
44.
12. Baer, supra note 3, at 590; Vicki Schultz et al., Global Perspectives on Workplace Harassment
Law: Proceedings of the 2004 Annual Meeting, Association ofAmerican Law Schools Section On Labor
Relations and Employment Law, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 151, 154-61 (2004).
13. See Abigail C. Saguy, Employment Discrimination or Sexual Violence?: Defining Sexual
Harassment in American and French Law, 34 L. & Soc'Y REv. 1091 (2000).
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differences in this context reflect cultural differences that are similarly evident
in other places throughout the law. 14 Dignity is a well-established value and
prime concern in continental European culture due to the fact that "continental
law has developed in the shadow of a long history of resentment of status-
differences of the past."' 15 This principle appears in various legal contexts such
as European employment law, which is "driven by the idea that European




The central role of dignity in continental European culture and law is reflected
in its consensual constitutional status.17 The German Constitution (Basic Law)
refers to human dignity as the first and most fundamental individual right.'
8
Many other member states of the European Union, such as Belgium, Greece,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, have included a right to dignity in their
constitutions. 19  Similarly, the newly-proclaimed European Charter of
Fundamental Rights opens with a right to dignity.
20
A second factor that some scholars consider relevant to the continental
European tendency to define sexual harassment as a dignitary harm rather than
as a form of discrimination is the lessened recognition in Europe of the
relationship between sexual harassment and sex-based discrimination. A few
studies that explored the evolution of sexual harassment law in continental
Europe concluded that, in countries such as France or Germany, dignity was
perceived as providing a clearer and a more understandable definition of the
harm associated with sexual harassment than gender equality.2' In other words,
once confronted with instances of workplace abuse and humiliation in the form
14. Baer, supra note 3, at 589; Bernstein, supra note 3; Saguy, supra note 13.
15. Friedman & Whitman, supra note 5, at 267. Friedman and Whitman further explain in this
context that:
[C]ontinental countries are places where high-status persons used to lord status-differences
over their inferiors in insulting and degrading ways. As a reaction against this history,
continental law now often aims to guarantee that all persons will be treated with respect. This
is an urge that shows up in various areas of the law such as the law of insult, the law of hate
speech ....
Id.; see also James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1164-71 (2004) (discussing the centrality of the right to respect and personal dignity in
European culture and law).
16. Friedman & Whitman, supra note 5, at 267.
17. Baer, supra note 3, at 589.
18. Article I, Section 1 of the Basic Law reads, "Human Dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. I § I (F.R.G.),
translated in DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 507 (2d ed. 1997). This strong emphasis on dignity as a fundamental human right
correlates more broadly to the German understanding of harm developed after 1945, when human
dignity came to symbolize the harm of the worst kind that had occurred. See Baer, supra note 3, at 589.
19. DE BELGISCHE GRONDEWET [Constitution] art. 23 (BeIg.); 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN]
[Constitution] 2 (Greece); COSTITUZIONE [Constitution] arts. 2, 41 (Italy); CONSTITUICAO [Constitution]
art. I (Port.); CONSTITUCION [C.E.] art. 10 (Spain); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [Constitution] 2:1
(Swed.); see Baer, supra note 3, at 589 n.39.
20. Article I reads, "Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected." 2000 O.J. (C
364) 9, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf.
21. ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT? FROM CAPITOL HILL TO THE SORBONNE
42 (2003).
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of sexual harassment, many Europeans understood those instances first and
foremost as injuries to personal dignity. Abigail Saguy, who investigated the
evolution of sexual harassment law in France, points out that, at least in the
French context, this perceptional difference between the European and
American approaches to sexual harassment is coupled with an anti-American
sentiment that, in France, often regards American society as puritanical.22 She
explains that when penal reform in 1991 provided an opportunity for French
feminists to propose a new penal law on sexual harassment, the original
proposal did declare that sexual harassment was based on sex and could
compromise equality in employment. Yet while French proponents of this
proposal drew on the legal analysis of North American feminists to strengthen
their platform, "their opponents used anti-American rhetoric to discredit the bill
as an import that would replicate American excesses of litigiousness,
Puritanism, and the battle of the sexes in France." Such anti-American rhetoric
provided justification for employing a dignitary approach to sexual harassment
that was painted as a more realistic definition of sexual harassment, and
therefore supported a general failure to understand and codify sexual
harassment as gender discrimination.
23
The dignitary aspects of sexual harassment law in Europe attracted the
attention of a few American feminists starting in the 1990s. Growing interest in
the comparative aspects of sexual harassment law, coupled with critiques of
American sexual harassment caselaw, shifted some of the focus across the
22. Saguy, supra note 13, at 1114.
23. Abigail Saguy, French and American Lawyers Define Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 3, at 602, 605. After review, the National Assembly's
Commission on Laws moved the sexual harassment bill out of the section on discrimination and into the
rubric of "sexual violence other than rape." Under this legal structure, sexual harassment was legally
categorized primarily as a deviant individual attack that is physically, psychologically, or morally
harmful and violates the victim's free will, rather than as a form of group-based discrimination. SAGUY,
supra note 21, at 44. A recent penal reform further emphasized this dignitary paradigm of sexual
harassment. In 2002, the French Penal Code was modified to include a paragraph criminalizing all forms
of harassment that can impair "the rights and dignity" of any employee. French lawmakers inscribed the
following statute into the penal code:
The act of harassing another with repeated actions having as object or effect degradation of
work conditions susceptible to undermining that person's rights and dignity, altering that
person's physical or mental health, or compromising their professional future, is punished by
[a maximum of] one year of imprisonment and [a maximum] fine of 15,000 euros.
C. PEN. art. 222-33-2 (Fr.), translated in SAGUY, supra note 21, at 147. The main object of this reform
was to prohibit the newly conceptualized problem of "moral harassment." Moral harassment refers to
any form of interpersonal violence or abuse among coworkers; this perspective views sexual harassment
as one category of this broader phenomenon of harassment that has no group-based dimension and is
strictly understood as individual dignitary harm. For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of moral
harassment and its distinction from sexual harassment, see SAGUY, supra note 21, at 144-51; Friedman
& Whitman, supra note 5, at 246-62; Maria Isabel S. Guerrero, The Development of Moral Harassment
(or Mobbing) Law in Sweden and France as a Step Towards EU Legislation, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 477, 488-93 (2004); and Rachel A. Yuen, Beyond the Schoolyard: Workplace Bullying and Moral
Harassment Law in France and Quebec, 38 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 625, 634-41 (2005). By positioning
sexual harassment within the framework of moral harassment, this amendment reinforced the framing of
sexual harassment as a dignity-based phenomenon rather than a form of group-based employment
discrimination.
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Atlantic. In one of the first scholarly efforts to reexamine American workplace
sexual harassment in light of the European example, Anita Bernstein tried to
highlight possible European contributions to the discussion and analysis of
sexual harassment. 24 Among other things, Bernstein identified the role of
dignity in the European context and examined the pragmatic advantages of
linking sexual harassment with such a concept. Her claim was that such linkage
provided a conceptual advantage, since "[a]ppeals to 'dignity' may resonate
with persons who cannot listen to 'feminism,' 'women's rights,' 'sexism,'
'sexual harassment,' and the like." 25 Furthermore, Bernstein also argued that as
a familiar and well-rooted concept, dignity, provided a clearer expression of the
harm associated with sexual harassment. In her view, the dignitary harm of
harassment could be better understood in reference to the broader history of
documented unjust treatment of workers and the more general issue of workers'
rights.2 6
In Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, Bernstein further elaborated
on this theme, explaining the normative contribution of the concepts of dignity
and respect to the analysis of sexual harassment. 27 She claimed that "hostile
environment sexual harassment" is fundamentally a dignitary harm-a form of
"incivility" and "disrespect., 28 She therefore suggested shifting the focus of
sexual harassment doctrine away from the "reasonable victim" standard29 to the
"respectful person" standard.30 Instead of focusing on the victim's perspective
and requiring plaintiffs to prove that a "reasonable person" would also find the
environment hostile or abusive, her idea was to shift the focus of evaluation to
require plaintiffs in hostile environment complaints to prove that the harasser
"did not conform to the standard of a respectful person." 31 Drawing on both
philosophical discussions of the norm of respect 32 and on the common-sense
understanding of sexual harassment, 33 she concluded that, since "a respectful
person does not humiliate another person" but rather "appreciates the dignity of
[others], 34 integrating a standard of respect into the analysis of sexual
harassment would make it easier to identify prohibited forms of harassment.
35
24. Bernstein, supra note 3.
25. Id. at 1263.
26. Id. at 1263-64.
27. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 11l HARv. L. REV. 445 (1997).
28. Id. at 450.
29. The "reasonable victim" or the "reasonable person" standard was first articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17. 21 (1993). In refining its standards for
hostile environment sexual harassment, the Court decided that, to be actionable, an environment of
sexual harassment had to be "objectively hostile"-one that a "reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive"-as well as hostile to the plaintiff herself. Id.
30. Bernstein, supra note 27, at 454.
31. Id. at 503.
32. Id. at 483-92.
33. Id. at 521-24.
34. Id. at 524.
35. Id. at 524-27.
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Moreover, compared to "reasonableness," she perceived "respect" as a concept
that is less burdened with gender-biased entailments.
3 6
In the late 1990s, following Bernstein's dignity-based challenge to the
standard under which sexual harassment complaints are evaluated in the United
States, Rosa Ehrenreich argued for a tort law supplement to Title VII
doctrine.3 7 In her view, excessive reliance on Title VII had led scholars to
overlook the fact that workplace harassment is fundamentally a dignitary
harm. More specifically, she claimed that many incidents of sexual
harassment involve actions that humiliate, torment, threaten, intimidate,
pressure, demean, frighten, outrage, or injure a reasonable person and are
therefore actions that can be said to injure an individual's dignitary interests in
a manner that can give rise to causes of action in tort.3 9 She therefore suggested
balancing Title VII, with its emphasis on sex discrimination, with an equal
focus on the dignitary harms inherent in certain aspects of harassment. 40 In her
opinion, this additional focus would permit the development of broad, tort-
based remedies for the many kinds of non-discriminatory and non-sexual harms
to dignity that injure both men and women in the workplace.4 1 Within this new
expanded framework of analysis, it would be possible to apply tort-based
causes of action to cases of sexual harassment that do not appear to be
motivated by sex discrimination, while cases motivated by sex discrimination
could continue to be brought under Title VII.
4 2
Both Bernstein and Ehrenreich believed that sexual harassment law should
identify and address the dignitary harm involved in many incidents of sexual
harassment. Yet, rather than seeking to duplicate the European model with its
sole focus on dignity, they sought to create a more diversified understanding of
sexual harassment. Contrary to other American scholars who contested the
discrimination paradigm of sexual harassment altogether, sometimes out of a
36. Id. at 464-71, 525.
37. Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of
Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999).
38. Id. at 14-16.
39. Id. at 22.
40. Id. at 53-60.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 60-64. In summarizing her position, Ehrenreich explained:
A pluralistic understanding of workplace harassment--one that embraces both common law
torts and Title VII within its ambit-has three important benefits. First, such a pluralistic
approach allows for a legal remedy for the many workers who experience severe harassment
on the job, but who would be hard pressed to assert that their harassment was "because of
sex," as required by even the most expansive reading of Title VII. Second, a pluralistic
approach keeps the focus of Title VII where it should be: on addressing the problem of
widespread workplace discrimination against members of discrete and vulnerable
groups .... Third, grounding understanding of the sexual harassment of women in a notion
of dignitary harm as well as in a discrimination paradigm makes a critical political and
philosophical point: Workplace harassment of women is wrong not because women are
women, but because women are human beings and share with all other human beings the
right to be treated with respect and concern.
Id. at 60.
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specific rejection of feminist arguments regarding an inherent link between
sexual harassment and gender inequality, 43 both Bernstein and Ehrenreich
sought to strengthen, not undermine, the feminist position against sexual
harassment. They argued not for replacing the traditional paradigm of
discrimination but for supplementing it, so that in addition to gender equality,
dignity too would provide a relevant reference for understanding the wrongs of
sexual harassment. In the United States, however, this suggestion to divert the
focus of harassment law from discrimination to dignity has remained a
hypothetical challenge, endorsed in later years by some new proponents and
vigorously opposed by others.44
In Israel, on the other hand, reframing the discussion of sexual harassment
in dignitary terms has had a serious practical impact. It has contributed to legal
reforms that officially recognized dignity as a primary value for the analysis of
sexual harassment and its harms. The Israeli law formally resembles some
European laws dealing with sexual harassment, and, as discussed in Part II,
similar factors played a role in shaping sexual harassment law in Europe and
Israel. However, Israeli law aspired to achieve the more complicated task that
American scholars like Bernstein and Ehrenreich envisioned: to create a more
diversified understanding of sexual harassment that truly combines dignity and
gender equality in the analysis of this phenomenon and its harms.
II. ISRAEL'S PREVENTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW-A NEW APPROACH
TO AN OLD PROBLEM
A. General Background
The Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law of 1998 was not the first Israeli
attempt to cope with the problem of sexual harassment. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Law of 198841 (EEOL) that was enacted a decade earlier provided
43. Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment As a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability
Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375 (1998); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex
Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333 (1990).
44. The most elaborated critique of Bernstein's dignitary challenge to sexual harassment law was
articulated by Kathryn Abrams. See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998). For the full exchange between Abrams and Bernstein, see Kathryn
Abrams, Postscript, Spring 1998: A Response to Professors Bernstein and Franke, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1257 (1998); and Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1231 (1998). In recent years, with the growing interest among American scholars in the newly
conceptualized problem of "moral harassment" (or workplace bullying) in Europe, some have argued
that a non-status based approach to harassment that focuses on the individual dignitary harm of
harassment at work will benefit women as well as other protected groups. More specifically, the claim is
that harassment of workers is not always about sex or race and therefore general, status-blind hostile
environment protection will provide better protection for all workers, including women, against any
form of interpersonal violence or abuse at work. See Coleman, supra note 11; David C. Yamada, The
Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment
Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000); see also Saguy, supra note 21, at 145-50.
45. Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 1988, S.H. 38 (Isr.).
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partial protection against sexual harassment. This early legislation defined
sexual harassment very narrowly. Section 7 of the EEOL prohibited employers
from mistreating employees who had refused or objected to propositions or acts
46
of a sexual nature initiated by the employer or supervisor. In other words, this
section forbade the disparate treatment of workers who objected to sexual
propositions, but did not independently prohibit these sexual propositions or
behaviors. By barring retaliation against sexually harassed employees in the
context of an equal employment opportunity law, legislators implicitly linked
sexual harassment with sex-based discrimination. This framework was
influenced by the American conceptualization of sexual harassment as
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 47 However, despite the formal reference
to discrimination, the legislative history of the EEOL reveals that those
involved in this initial legislative process rejected the possibility of defining
sexual harassment as a discriminatory practice because the relationship
between sexual harassment and sex-based discrimination was unclear to many
legislators. 48 The only aspect of discrimination they identified in this context
was quid pro quo harassment, where an employer took discriminatory action
against an employee who refused his or her sexual proposals by denying an
employment right. Within this legal framework, the very subjection of an
employee to harassing sexual demands or to hostile environment sexual
harassment was not defined as a prohibited behavior at all. Sexual harassment
was prohibited under the EEOL only with regard to some of its forms and only
when the legislature had managed to explicitly connect those forms to the
notion of sex-based discrimination.49 This formal rejection of a substantive link
between many forms of sexual harassment and sex-based discrimination
resulted in the litigation of very few cases in the years following the original
law's enactment.
50
Some Israeli feminist groups and individuals felt that something was amiss.
Hoping to correct the EEOL's deficiencies, these groups and individuals
46. Such protection was afforded only in listed areas: hiring, work conditions, promotions, training
and professional development, firing, and compensation for dismissal. Id. §§ 2, 7.
47. Rachel Benziman, Sexual Harassment at the Workplace, in WOMEN'S STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW
AND SOCIETY 318, 326-28 (Frances Raday, Cannel Shalev & Michal Liban Kooby eds., 1995); Orit
Kamir, Rethinking Sexual Harassment in Terms of Human Dignity-Respect, 29 MISHPATIM 317, 362
(1998) (Isr.).
48. Orit Kamir, who investigated the legislative history of the EEOL, concluded:
The legislative process of 1988 reveals that as part of the general view of the Israeli
parliament and maybe of the Israeli society in general, the phenomenon of sexual harassment
is not perceived as a violation of sex-based equality, and even as not exclusively relevant to
the employment context.
Orit Kamir, supra note 47, at 373. For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the sexual
harassment section that was eventually included in the EEOL, see id. at 361-73.
49. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50. See Benziman, supra note 47, at 338; Orit Kamir, Dignity, Respect, and Equality in Israel's
Sexual Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 3, at 561, 562.
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proposed a new model law for the prevention of sexual harassment. 51 One of
the leading feminist forces behind the new legislation was law professor Orit
Kamir. She was joined by Rachel Benziman, the legal advisor of the Women's
Network. Other feminist groups and individuals who were partners in the
legislative process were law professors Ruth Ben-Israel and Frances Raday and
the women's organizations Wizo and Na'amat.52 The Ministry of Justice and
the Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Women adopted the proposed
model law and this legislative proposal served as the basis for the parliamentary
formulation of Israel's Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 53 which was
enacted in 1998. 54
The Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law provides a broader conceptual
framework for the analysis of sexual harassment than the 1988 EEOL in two
substantive areas. First, the law contains detailed definitions of several types of
sexually harassing behaviors, 55 and provides for civil and criminal sanctions for
each type of such behavior56 in social settings such as the street, the educational
system, or the military-not only in the workplace.57 Hence the new law
51. Kamir, supra note 50, at 562.
52. For a detailed analysis of the role of Israeli feminist groups and individuals in the legislative
process, see Noya Rimalt, On Sex, Sexuality and Human Dignity: The Law for the Prevention of Sexual
Harassment in Light of Feminist Theory and Legal Reality, 35 MISHPATIM 601,606-11 (2005) (Isr.).
53. Id.
54. Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1998, S.H. 166 (lsr.).
55. Section 3(a) provides:
(a) Each of the following acts constitutes sexual harassment:
(1) extortion by threats, as defined in section 428 of the Penal Law, where the act demanded
to be performed by the person is of a sexual character;
(2) indecent acts, as defined in sections 348 and 349 of the Penal Law;
(3) repeated propositions of a sexual nature, addressed to a person, who demonstrated to the
harasser that he is not interested in the said propositions;
(4) repeated references directed towards a person, and focus on his sexuality, where that
person demonstrated to the harasser that he is not interested in the said references;
(5) a degrading or humiliating reference to a person concerning his gender, or sexuality,
including his sexual orientation;
(6) propositions or references as described in subsections (3) or (4), directed towards one of
those enumerated in subsections (a) to (e), in such circumstances as specified in such
subsections, even if the harassed person did not demonstrate to the harasser that he is not
interested in the said propositions or references: (a) toward a minor or a helpless person,
where a relationship of authority, dependence, education or treatment is being exploited; (b)
toward a patient undergoing mental or medical treatment, where a relationship of dependence
between the patient and the person treating him is being exploited; (c) toward an employee
within the framework of an employment relationship, and toward a person on service within
the framework of a service-where a position of authority in a work relationship or in service
is being exploited; (d) toward a pupil in the 12th, 13th or 14th grade who is not a minor,
where a relationship of authority is being exploited at school; (e) toward a pupil or student,
who studies at an institution that provides academic or vocational training for adults (in this
Law: adult education institution) where a relationship of authority is being exploited at
school.
Id. § 3.
56. Under section 6, all types of sexual harassment defined in section 3 constitute civil wrongs. All
of them (except blackmail by way of threats and indecent acts, which are already prohibited by the
Israeli Penal Law) are also defined in section 5 of the law as criminal offenses. The criminal sanction set
out in section 5 is two years of imprisonment for sexual harassment, three years for related intimidation,
and four years for both sexual harassment and related intimidation. Id.
57. The law provides a general prohibition against sexual harassment that is not restricted to a
particular context. Section 4 states: "A person shall not sexually harass another person and shall not
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constitutes both a civil and a criminal prohibition against sexual harassment
that is not restricted to the employment context. Second, the Prevention of
Sexual Harassment Law reconceptualizes sexual harassment primarily as a
dignitary harm. Unlike American law, the Israeli law refers to the
discriminatory aspect of this social practice as an additional (rather than
exclusive) feature of the wrong of sexual harassment. Section 1 states the law's
objective: "to prohibit sexual harassment, in order to protect human dignity,
liberty and privacy and to promote equality between the sexes. ' 8
B. Relevant Features and Underlying Rationales
In initiating conceptual reforms in sexual harassment law, Israeli feminists
who promoted the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law relied on a range of
arguments. Their decision to emphasize sexual harassment's harm to human
dignity, rather than its harm to equality, was due to pragmatic as well as
substantive reasoning.
First, due to the significant political influence of Jewish Orthodox parties,
equality is not a fully recognized constitutional right in Israel.59 On the other
hand, the right to human dignity, respect, and honor has recently gained
constitutional status in Israel. 60 The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,
61
which is now generally accepted as part of Israel's "semi-constitution," refers
to this assembly of values as the foundation of the Israeli legal system.
62
retaliate against another person." Retaliation is defined in section 3(b) as "any injury that stems from
sexual harassment or from a complaint or suit submitted because of sexual harassment." Section 11
clarifies that the law's provisions apply to the State and the Civil Service, and that all security forces
(the Israeli Defense Forces, the Israeli Police, the Prison Service, and all other defense organizations of
the State) will be deemed as employers and the persons serving in them as employees. Id. Hence, the
combination of sections 4 and 11 provides a general prohibition against sexual harassment that is
applicable in all possible contexts.
58. Id. § 1.
59. Israel does not have a comprehensive bill of rights, nor does Israel maintain a separation
between church and state, but instead applies the rule of religious law in the area of family law. Since
religious systems of law-and especially Jewish law and Muslim Law--often discriminate against
women, no full constitutional equality for women can be guaranteed under the current Israeli legal
framework. Until now, all efforts to enact a comprehensive bill of rights that would formally include the
right to equality have failed. For a description of the status of equality in the Israeli legal system, see
RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL 24-42 (2004).
60. The Hebrew language does not formally distinguish between the terms dignity, honor, and
respect. The word "kavod" is the only Hebrew term that corresponds to the English words "honor,"
"dignity," and "respect." Therefore, when the Israeli legislature enacted the right to "kavod" as a basic
right, it granted a constitutional status to this complex assembly of values. See Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, 1391 LSI 150 (1992) (Isr.). For a detailed analysis of this linguistic
aspect of the term "kavod" and its significance in the context of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment
Law, see infra Section 1l.C.
61. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, 1391 LSI 150 (1992) (lsr.).
62. In the early 1990s, instead of a comprehensive written constitution, Israel enacted two new
"Basic Laws" that address human rights guarantees: Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, id., and
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5752-1992, 1454 LSI 90 (1992) (Isr.). These laws were designed to
eventually be codified into a comprehensive bill of rights. Therefore, the Israeli Supreme Court
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Similar to some continental European countries, Israel has thus awarded a
special constitutional status to the value of human dignity. In light of these
legal developments, feminist proponents of the new law concluded that
devising a culturally sensitive item of legislation based on accepted and
constitutionally-anchored values and norms would make the prohibition against
sexual harassment more effective.
63
Second, drawing on American sexual harassment caselaw and legislation,
64
Israeli feminists focused on what they perceived as major drawbacks in the
65American Title VII model. Professor Orit Kamir argued that one of the
deficiencies of the U.S. model is the exclusive association of sexual harassment
with sex-based discrimination. 66 Adopting arguments previously made by
American scholars such as Katherine Franke, 67 she claimed that the substantial
link between sexual harassment and discrimination--derived from Catharine
MacKinnon's work on sexual harassment-has proven to be very problematic
in its adoption by the courts. MacKinnon's radical notion of equality based on a
theory of gender subordination was "too complicated or too radical for most
judges.' 69 Instead of adopting MacKinnon's subordination argument, which is
"necessary to make the logical bridge" between sexually harassing behavior
and gender discrimination, American judges have concluded that sexual
harassment is sex discrimination only when it violates the formal equality
principle of equal treatment to those who are similarly situated.7 ° In other
words, while MacKinnon focused on the disparate impact of sexual harassment
and articulated how sexual harassment institutionalized the sexual
subordination of women, American courts framed the problem as one of equal
treatment and determined that the critical issue "is whether members of one sex
are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed. ' '71 In Kamir's view this explanation
interpreted these new basic laws as granting the judiciary the power to strike down any legislation that
violates the basic rights guaranteed by the two Basic Laws. However, according to specific provisions in
the Basic Laws, this judicial power is restricted to laws passed after the enactment of these Basic Laws.
RUTH HALPERIN- KADDARI, supra note 59, at 24-25.
63. Kamir, supra note 50, at 568.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 564-65.
67. Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997).
68. MacKinnon argues that the anti-subordination or the inequality approach best explains the harm
of sexual harassment when applied to women's working lives and has the greatest potential to transform
sexually discriminatory workplace practices through the use of law. In her view, "a rule or practice is
discriminatory, in the inequality approach, if it participates in the systematic social deprivation of one
sex because of sex." CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979). Therefore, sexual harassment is sex discrimination because it helps
create and further inequality between the sexes by perpetuating the interlocked structure through which
women have been kept sexually in thrall to men and at the bottom of the labor market. Id. at 174-92.
69. Franke, supra note 67, at 729.
70. Kamir, supra note 50, at 565.
71. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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worked well in cases where heterosexual men harass women, 72 but worked less
well in cases such as that of the "equal opportunity harasser": the person who
harasses both men and women.73 In such cases, judges could logically argue
that no one had been treated differently on the basis of gender, and that,
therefore, no discrimination occurred.74 Moreover, relying on MacKinnon's
critique regarding the inherently male-biased nature of formal equality, 75 Kamir
argued that this formal equality "does not and cannot remedy women who
suffer from sex discrimination, for the simple reason that, under patriarchy
women are not 'similarly situated' to men." 76 Based on this analysis, Israeli
feminists worried that the prevalent judicial notion of formal equality, deeply
embedded as it is in conservative thought, might restrict the development of
sexual harassment law.77 They worried that this limited understanding of the
relationship between sexual harassment and sex-based discrimination was
likely to be "incoherent, unconvincing and at times ineffective," 78 leading to an
inadequate definition of the harms of sexual harassment. As opposed to
equality, Israeli feminists claimed that dignity or respect were less entangled in
gendered controversies and therefore provided a more promising conceptual
framework for the analysis of sexual harassment.79 Hence, the Israeli
conclusion was that new sexual harassment legislation would profit from
association with other social values (besides equality), primarily human dignity
and respect. While MacKinnon aspired to promote a substantive concept of sex
equality based on the anti-subordination or the inequality approach,8 ° feminist
72. Kamir, supra note 50.
73. Id. The problem of the "equal opportunity harasser" and the manner in which this phenomenon
challenges a concept of sex discrimination based on formal equality principles is discussed in the works
of other commentators. See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 37, at 9. Katherine Franke makes a similar
argument with regard to same-sex harassment and claims that the courts' formal conception of sex
discrimination is unable to provide a satisfactory account of the discriminatory wrong of same-sex
sexual harassment. See Franke, supra note 67.
74. Kamir, supra note 50, at 565. However, it should be noted that in practice very few alleged
harassers have sought to raise this defense. As Kenji Yoshino observes in this context, "Such defendants
appearmore often in fiction or hypotheticals than actual litigation; the defense has been raised in only
two cases and has been rejected in both." Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure,
52 STAN. L. REv. 353, 443 (2000).
75. In explaining the limits of formal equality according to which similarly situated people deserve
similar treatment, MacKinnon argued,
To define the reality of sex as difference and the warrant of equality as sameness is wrong on
both counts .... Once this is done, to require that one be the same as those who set the
standard-those which one is already socially defined as different from-simply means that
sex equality is conceptually designed never to be achieved. Those who most need equal
treatment will be the least similar, socially, to those whose situation sets the standard as
against which one's entitlement to be equally treated is measured. Doctrinally speaking, the
deepest problems of sex inequality will not find women 'similarly situated to men.'
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 32,44 (1987).




80. See MacKinnon, supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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proponents of the new legislation concluded that diverting the focus of the new
law from sex equality to human dignity would provide a better solution to the
problem of "patriarchal" equality since values like human dignity are less
entwined with conservative and patriarchal thought.
81
An additional argument in this context was that values such as dignity tie
in more with the common-sense understanding of the wrong of sexual
harassment as a dignitary harm. 82 Orit Kamir specifically explained, in this
context, that:
The advantage of the proposed definition is that within its framework,
the prohibition on sexual harassment means: "do not behave in a sexual
manner that violates a person's dignity and liberty." Despite the fact
that such a command seems broad and not specific, it appears to me
that in the current Israeli context, it has a very clear meaning.
83
The arguments regarding the pragmatic advantages of the dignitary paradigm of
sexual harassment law were supplemented with a more substantive defense of
this paradigmatic shift. Similar to scholars like Bernstein and Ehrenreich,
Kamir and other feminist proponents of the dignity-based aspects of the new
law adopted the European normative claim that sexual harassment is primarily
a form of disrespect to women, and that its conceptualization as a dignitary
harm truly characterizes an important aspect of this social practice. Also, in line
with American feminists and contrary to the European model, Israeli feminists
did not aspire to replace equality with dignity, but only to supplement and to
enrich the discussion of sexual harassment and its harms. Kamir claimed that
conceptualizing sexual harassment in terms of dignity and respect does not
require-and in fact should not lead to-"its separation from notions of
equality":
84
Dignity, respect, liberty, and equality need not be posed as competing
or exclusionary values; on the contrary, in the context of sexual
harassment law, they should rather be read as complementary. Sexual
harassment discriminates against women by not respecting them as
women and as human beings, by violating their dignity, and by
restricting their liberty to determine themselves and to lead lives free
of fear and restriction. It disrespects women and violates their dignity
by mirroring and perpetuating a social reality that does not treat them
as equal. The more commonsense notions of dignity, respect, and
liberty can be useful in conveying the harm caused by sexual
harassment, and in illuminating its sex-discriminatory harm.85
81. Kamir, supra note 50.
82. Kamir, supra note 50, at 376.
83. Id.
84. Kamir, supra note 50, at 568.
85. Id. (citations omitted).
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The explanatory notes 6 attached to the proposed legislation stressed this
ideological point, linking the degradation to dignity that results from sexual
harassment to a notion of gender equality.87 This note depicted sexual
harassment as an offense that humiliates its victims, degrades them, and
invades their privacy, 88 and added that "the sexual harassment of women
humiliates them in relation to their sex or sexuality, and hinders their ability to
enter the workforce and other areas of life as equal members, and as such hurts
their equality."8 9 The new law itself emphasized this dignity-equality nexus and
declared in section 1 that its objective was "to prohibit sexual harassment in
order to protect human dignity, liberty and privacy and to promote equality
between the sexes." 90 Thus, with the enactment of the Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law, what some American scholars had discussed on a theoretical
level became a legal reality in Israel.
In addition to this interrelated approach to sexual harassment, the law
included a very detailed formal definition of what constitutes sexually
harassing behavior and provided both civil and criminal sanctions for each type
of behavior. As opposed to the American Title VII, which contains no
definition of sexual harassment, the Israeli law was designed to provide better
guidance to the Israeli courts in their efforts to identify prohibited forms of
harassment. The decision to criminalize sexual harassment, in addition to its
civil implications, was based on the argument that criminal law is widely
considered by Israelis as the most important legal expression of society's
fundamental values.93 This consideration, in addition to the assumption that
criminal laws are both easier to enact and more readily applied by the courts,
94
led to the criminalization of all forms of sexual harassment alongside their
definition as tortious wrongs and labor law violations. This marked another
sharp, intentional departure from the American prohibition against sexual
harassment contained within Title VII. 95 In an effort to supply a full and clear
definition of the new norm prohibiting sexual harassment and to strengthen the
criminal aspect of the law, some sex offenses such as "indecent acts'96 or
"sexual blackmail by way of threats"97 that were already prohibited by the
provisions of the Israeli Penal Law were defined in the 1998 statute as types of
86. Official explanatory notes are drafted by the Ministry of Justice and are attached to a draft law
for its first hearing in the Knesset. The notes serve courts as guidelines for interpretation.
87. Draft bill of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1997, HH, 484 (on file with author).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1998, S.H. 166 § I (Isr.).
91. Id. § 3. For the exact wording of the law, see supra note 55.
92. See Kamir, supra note 50, at 563-64.
93. Id. at 568.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1998, S.H. 166 § 3(a)(2) (Isr.).
97. Id. § 3(a)(1).
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sexual harassment as well. 98 This category of sex offenses was integrated into
section 3 as the first in a list of behaviors that the law prohibits and denounces.
The feminist campaign for the new legislation was short and successful.
Feminist groups and individuals, promoting their idea to replace the existing
sexual harassment legislation with a broader statute, sought involvement in the
legislative process by approaching the Ministry of Justice and the Knesset
Committee for the Advancement of the Status of Women. 99 The basic
conceptual frameworks proposed by this feminist coalition were well received
by state officials and The Knesset members involved in the legislative process
and served as the basis for the parliamentary formulation of the new Israeli
statute.100 The Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law was approved by a large
majority vote in the predominately conservative Knesset. Most members of the
Knesset, ranging from the extreme right and the ultra-orthodox parties to the
socially progressive parties, declared their support for the law. 10 1 Furthermore,
despite the gender-neutral language of the law, both the feminist forces who
promoted the legislation and the legislators who drafted the final version of the
law and voted for it clearly perceived the new law as aiming to combat a social
phenomenon that disproportionately injured women. 102 As a symbolic and
deliberate act, the Knesset approved the final version of the bill on International
Women's Day-March 10, 1998-along with another piece of legislation
establishing a statutory body in charge of the promotion of women's status in
society. 1 03
Feminist expectations for the new legislation were tremendous. The
Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law was presented as a consciousness-
98. Kamir, supra note 50, at 570-71.
99. For an account of the feminist forces in Israel who contributed to the formulation of the
Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
101. See Tzili Mor, Law as a Tool for a Sexual Revolution: Israel's Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law-1998, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291 (2001).
102. The final version of the law was prepared by the Knesset Committee for the Advancement of
the Status of Women. The chairperson of the Committee Yael Dayan presented the proposed law to the
Knesset before the final vote of approval. During the parliamentary deliberations many members of
Knesset (MKs) referred to the new legislation in clearly gendered terms, specifically indicating that the
problem the law was designed to combat was predominantly a women's problem. For example, in her
introductory presentation to the Israeli Parliament, MK Yael Dayan explained:
[A]nd now we approach legislation that is relevant to everybody. It is relevant to the female
soldier and [her] officer. It is relevant to the policewoman and her boss, or her commanding
officer in the police force. It is relevant to the female student and her supervisor or professor
who teaches her. It is relevant to the female employee and her supervisor, and to the [attitude
of the] male worker toward a female worker. That is, we are covering here all possibilities to
protect the woman ....
Legislative Proposal on the Prevention of Sexual Harassment-1998, Second and Third Reading, DK
(1998) 5890, 5900 (on file with author). MK Binyamin Elon added, "A woman is not a sexual object,
and it is intolerable that there is a cultural attitude of treating a woman as a sexual object when she says
please do not talk to me like this." Id. Similar gendered references to the law can be found in the
speeches of other Members of Knesset such as Tamar Goznasky, Reuven Rivlin, Anat Maor, and
Rechavam Ze'Evi. Id.
103. Authority for the Advancement of the Status of Women Law, 1998, S.H. 171 § 2 (Isr.).
2008]
Yale Joumal of Law and Feminism
raising tool that would mark a new era in the awareness of this social
phenomenon among the Israeli public. 104 Yet it appears that in building up
those expectations, Israeli feminists failed to take full account of the potential
implications of the conceptual choices ingrained in the new legislation. They
especially neglected to appreciate the full significance of the
reconceptualization of sexual harassment primarily as a dignitary harm.
C. The Dignitary Paradigm of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law-
Normative Ambiguity and Gendered Implications
The Hebrew language does not formally distinguish between the terms
honor, respect, and dignity.'0 5 The word kavod is the only Hebrew term that
corresponds to these three terms. There is thus a complexity of meanings and
concepts inherent in one term. In Israeli culture and society, as well as in Israeli
law, the term 'human dignity' (kavod ha-adam) is inseparable from, while
sometimes at variance with, other values representing distinct sentiments and
even contradictory value systems. The feminist forces who initiated the
reference to the term kavod as an integral component of the dignitary paradigm
of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law were seeking to capture the
modem liberal meaning of that term, and to preserve a substantive link between
kavod as human dignity and gender equality.10 6 Gender equality was also
mentioned as a separate relevant value in section 1. However, once kavod was
integrated into the new legislation, it paved the way for other intuitive concepts
associated with this term, some of them deeply entangled with patriarchal
ideology and reality. It also created some confusion as to the exact rationale
and goals of the new legislation. This normative confusion may have
contributed to broad parliamentary support for the new law by a spontaneous
coalition of feminists, right-wing conservatives, and religious orthodox
groups. 107 One such unexpected supporter, MK Binyamin Elon-an Orthodox
Jew who was a member of the Knesset Committee for the Advancement of the
Status of Women, which drafted the final version of the law-summarized the
sentiments of many during the parliamentary debate over the proposed law:
This law is good, this law has to pass and it will add delicacy,
integrity, honor and gracefulness in Israeli society .... To me nobody
104. For instance, shortly after its enactment, Tzili Mor described the new law in the following
manner: "Israeli women's rights advocacy groups succeeded in passing one of the most progressive laws
in the world." Mor, supra note 101, at 330.
105. The Hebrew-English dictionary translates the word 'kavod' in Hebrew as "honour, respect,
glory, splendour [sic] .... THE COMPLETE HEBREW-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 984 (R. Alcalay ed., new
enlarged ed. 1990). No other word in Hebrew carries a similar meaning. Hence contemporary Israeli
Hebrew does not offer a formal terminology to distinguish between the terms dignity, honor, and
respect, as they are all potential meanings of the single term "kavod."
106. Kamir, supra note 50, at 568.
107. Mor, supra note 101, at 292.
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will say "honey" and ask me to sleep with them just like that when
they pass me in the corridor. But to say this to a woman is permissible.
Why? because she is a woman. This is not modest. This I find
unacceptable.
10 8
This supporter of the new law here correlates sexual harassment with a
superficial rather than substantive concept of gender equality. Although he was
referring to women in particular as the injured group, his notions of the
gendered harm caused by sexual harassment seemed to derive from concepts
associating kavod with honor rather than with human dignity. Framing the
breach of modesty as the main injury of sexual harassment, Elon portrays the
proposed legislation as designed to promote delicacy and gracefulness in
society on equal terms for both men and women, thus creating a very different
rationale for the approval of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law than its
initiators had in mind. As MK Elon interpreted it, the new law was not intended
to advance women's equal rights in the workplace. Instead, he redefined the
primary goal of the new law as relating to the protection of women's sexual
modesty and to society's interest in preserving this aspect of women's honor.
Against this understanding of kavod as honor, other proponents of the law
presented an alternative perception that correlated kavod with "human dignity,"
as feminist proponents of the new law intended. However, this alternative
perception was problematic in a different manner, since it separated dignity
from equality and defined sexual harassment in gender-neutral and individual
terms. Drora Nachmani-Roth, a senior attorney with the Ministry of Justice
who participated in the parliamentary deliberation over the new legislation,
explained to other members of the Knesset Committee for the Advancement of
the Status of Women, "I believe that in time it will be said that the Sexual
Harassment Law is indeed designed to protect a person's privacy that derives
from dignity. Only in some aspects is there discrimination."'
10 9
It appears that while feminist proponents of the law aspired to promote an
integrated understanding of sexual harassment, one that reflects both its
dignitary and discriminatory harms, many of their partners in the legislative
process did not interpret the proposed legislation in a similar manner. Despite
the fact that the official language of the law refers to kavod as well as "the
equality between the sexes," it seems that the primary (and often the sole) focus
of many proponents was the former term, with its multiple meanings. Some,
like MK Elon, adhered to the honor aspect of kavod, thereby interpreting the
wrong of sexual harassment in clearly patriarchal terms. Others, like advocate
Drora Nachmani-Roth, diverted the discussion to the human dignity aspect of
the term, focusing on the elements of neutrality and individuality that typically
108. Legislative Proposal on the Prevention of Sexual Harassment- 1998, Second and Third
Reading, DK (1998) 5890, 5900 (on file with author).
109. Protocol No. 57: Meeting of the Committee for the Advancement of the Status of Women,
14th Knesset, 2d. Session, June 17, 1997 (Isr.) (on file with author).
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characterize the concept of human dignity. 110 Despite the fact that feminist
proponents, state officials, and The Knesset members all eventually rallied
behind the same legislation, those different supporters of the Prevention of
Sexual Harassment Law had very different views as to what its dignitary
paradigm implied.
The discursive ambiguity, which preceded the enactment of the Prevention
of Sexual Harassment Law, sheds light on the court opinions that followed. As
will be demonstrated and explained in Part III, Israeli courts in many ways
mirror the society they serve in their diverse understandings of the dignitary
harm of sexual harassment and in their interpretations of the Prevention of
Sexual Harassment Law.
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASELAW-FACTS AND ANALYSIS
The enactment of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law in 1998
brought about a marked increase in the number of court opinions dealing with
sexual harassment in Israel. The original prohibition against sexual harassment
anchored in the 1988 Equal Employment Opportunity Law yielded very few
complaints and consequently failed to produce meaningful judicial decisions on
sexual harassment over a period of ten years."'I My study has identified 222
reported court opinions and decisions 112 that were issued under the new
legislation between March 1998 and September 2006.1 13 These opinions
discuss and apply the prohibition against sexual harassment in various areas of
the law: criminal, civil, labor, disciplinary procedures against state employees,
and military procedures against military personnel. During these years the
Supreme Court of Israel interpreted and applied the Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law numerous times (mostly in appellate disciplinary proceedings
against state employees who were accused of sexually harassing other
110. Baer, supra note 3, at 586.
ll. The limited scope of the original prohibition against sexual harassment is most likely the
primary explanation for the exceedingly small number of cases litigated in the years before the
enactment of the new legislation. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
112. My study has identified decisions of various judicial bodies including magistrate courts,
appellate district courts, labor courts, military courts, disciplinary courts, and the Supreme Court of
Israel. Some of the decisions involved the discussion of the same case in two court instances. For
instance, in some cases I was able to trace both the magistrate court and the appellate court opinions. In
addition, in a few cases I was able to trace only a preliminary decision, possibly because the case was
settled or dropped or because the final opinion in the case was not reported. Thus, the total number of
222 reported cases includes multiple court opinions in the same case, and sometimes only a preliminary
decision in the case.
113. My review of sexual harassment court cases is comprehensive. I ran searches for all reported
sexual harassment cases in Israeli courts from the enactment of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment
Law in March 1998 until September 13, 2006. While the new legislation came into effect in September
1998, several cases that dealt with incidents of sexual harassment that occurred before that legislation
came into effect referred to the new legislation as a source of inspiration and interpretation. The most
prominent example is Ben-Asher. See infra notes 118-135 and accompanying text. Those cases therefore
became part of the relevant caselaw that I read and analyzed.
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employees),' 14 providing a detailed conceptual frame of reference that has
guided lower courts and shaped the nature and substance of judicial discourse
on sexual harassment in Israel. In this respect, the new sexual harassment
legislation has been very influential, producing a significant body of caselaw in
an area that was previously under-recognized and under-discussed in Israel.
However, examining the manner in which Israeli courts have "talked"
about sexual harassment and conceptualized its harm 1 5 reveals a growing gap
between the judge-made analysis of sexual harassment and the original feminist
goal behind the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law. Four major themes
characterize contemporary sexual harassment caselaw in Israel. First, the
caselaw prioritizes dignity over equality in the discussion of the wrong of
sexual harassment so much so that the discriminatory aspects of sexual
harassment are excluded from formal legal analysis. In contrast to the original
feminist intention of using the new legislation to promote a complex
understanding of the harm of sexual harassment based on a dignity-equality
nexus, courts have come to interpret the harm of sexual harassment solely in
dignitary terms. Second, once dignity becomes the exclusive basis for the
wrong of sexual harassment, courts sometimes discuss and explain this harm in
gender-neutral and individual terms that ignore and disguise the clear gendered
significance of the vast majority of sexual harassment cases. While almost all
reported cases in this area involve a male harasser, a female victim, 16 and a
gendered context of unequal power relations between the harasser and the
harassed, the courts analyze those cases in a gender-neutral manner that
disguises the real nature of sexual harassment and its particular harm to women
as a group. Third, the dignitary paradigm of sexual harassment is analyzed in
other cases in moralistic and patriarchal terms that associate dignity with honor
and link the harm of sexual harassment to Victorian perceptions of women's
honor instead of modem perceptions of human dignity. Women are then
stereotyped as fragile, sexually pure, and in need of special protection; the very
exposure of women to various sexual behaviors is presented as the central
wrong of sexual harassment. Fourth and finally, courts have focused
exclusively on the 'sexual' aspect of sexual harassment, thereby legitimating
114. The Supreme Court of Israel is an appellate court as well as the High Court of Justice. As an
appellate court, the supreme court considers cases (both criminal and civil) on judgments and other
decisions of the district courts. It also considers appeals on judicial and quasi-judicial decisions such as
disciplinary rulings.
15. While specifically identifying and analyzing the leading cases that have played a significant
role in shaping current discourse on sexual harassment, this study purposely refrained from focusing on
the tip of the litigation pyramid and examined the entire body of sexual harassment caselaw in an effort
to portray a very broad and comprehensive picture.
116. Of the 222 reported court opinions between March 1998 and September 2006 that were
analyzed as part of this study, only three involved men as targets of harassment. All other cases involved
the subjection of one woman or several women to sexually harassing behaviors, and in most of them the
harassment occurred in the context of clear power differences along gender lines. See supra notes 2,
113-114 and accompanying text.
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other forms of sex-based harassment that do not involve conduct of a sexual
nature. These last two themes usually work in conjunction to reinforce the
moralistic interpretation of the wrong of sexual harassment by creating a
normative link between 'sex' and the violation of women's honor. These four
themes, originally established in the two key decisions of the Israeli Supreme
Court, Ben-Asher and Galili, were further developed in subsequent cases. Ben-
Asher articulated the first, second, and fourth themes, and Galili supplemented
this framework of analysis with the third moralistic and patriarchal theme.
A. The Supreme Court of Israel
1. Four Conceptual Frames of Reference in Ben-Asher and Galili
The first explicit judicial reference to the Prevention of Sexual Harassment
Law appeared in Israel v. Ben-Asher,117 a supreme court case involving a
disciplinary procedure against a college professor who sexually harassed one of
his female students. Though technically decided on the basis of the pre-1998
law, 118 the court's opinion in Ben-Asher not only mentioned the pending
legislation, but also drew upon its theoretical underpinnings and its concrete
definitions of sexual harassment. Furthermore, the comprehensive opinion
upholding the plaintiff's claim outlined the basic judicial themes of analysis for
the new legislation.
Demonstrating the first theme, the court's decision to pay attention to the
harm against dignity marginalized the discriminatory aspect of the crime. The
court presented sexual harassment as an offense against human dignity, and
only in certain cases as a form of discrimination. 119 Instead of integrating the
concepts of equality and dignity, as the feminists who initiated this combined
definition of sexual harassment intended, the court created a dichotomized
understanding of the phenomenon, one that prioritized dignity over equality in
terms of the centrally relevant definition of the injury caused by sexual
harassment. While still mentioning gender equality 2-a reference that is
completely neglected in more recent cases-the Ben-Asher court presented the
discriminatory harm of sexual harassment as lying at the margins of this social
practice. Specifically, the court noted that "[s]exual harassment injures the
person, invariably the person's dignity, and sometimes other rights, such as the
ight to equality or the right to work ... ,,121 Further on the court declared,
"Indeed, in many cases sexual harassment and the ensuing impairment of the
working conditions can be viewed as a form of sexual discrimination. But
117. CSA 6713/96 Israel v. Ben-Asher [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 650.
118. The opinion in this case was issued one day before the law's enactment.
119. CSA 6713/96 Israel v. Ben-Asher [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 650, 662.
120. Id. at 669.
121. Id. at 662.
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sexual harassment is a distinct phenomenon .... and viewing it solely as a
form of discrimination blurs the uniqueness of this phenomenon."'' 2 2 The court
concluded by stating that, having surveyed the law concerning sexual
harassment in Israel and in various other countries, "[i]t is widely accepted in
Israel, as in other countries, that sexual harassment, aside from its potential
material damage, offends against human dignity."'
' 23
The court's opinion further undermined the significance of the group-based
aspects of sexual harassment and the relationship between this social practice
and gender inequality by attributing the problem primarily to "social behavior"
in a way that almost defends sexual harassment as a natural phenomenon:
Most of the victims of sexual harassment are women. . . . What is the
reason for the relative frequency of sexual harassment of women by
men? The obvious explanation is that, to a large extent, it expresses the
common view regarding differences in the acceptable behavior of men
and women in society. An additional explanation is that sexual
harassment is, inter alia, a manifestation of the lower status of women
in society, notably in employment. According to this explanation,
sexual harassment, as well as being a personal offense, also offends
against the principle of sexual equality.
This paragraph contains the opinion's most specific reference to the connection
between sexual harassment and the lower status of women in society.
Nevertheless, even this reference was articulated in a manner that undermines
its significance for the analysis of sexual harassment. The sexual harassment of
women by men was presented as something most certainly resulting from the
fact that men simply behave differently from women. The feminist claim
linking sexual harassment to the lower status of women in society was referred
to as an additional rather than primary explanation for the problem. This
analysis marginalized even further the role of equality, presenting gender
inequality as a possible, rather than as a definite, aspect of this phenomenon.
Ben-Asher also demonstrates the second theme, in which an excessive
focus on the dignitary harm of harassment and its characterization in gender-
neutral language leads to the gradual individualization of sexual harassment,
overlooking group harm caused by sexual harassment. Despite the fact that
Ben-Asher dealt with a typical incident of sexual harassment in terms of its
gendered dynamics, the court avoided any substantive account of the gendered
significance of the case. Using terminology such as "the harassing person,"
"the person being harassed" and the "individual dignitary harm"' 125 to describe
the case, the opinion disguised the fact that it was actually about a man in a
position of power who demanded sexual favors from a female student who was
122. Id. at 669.
123. Id. at 675.
124. Id. at 664.
125. Id. at 673.
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under his authority. Though the court acknowledged that "[s]tudies have shown
that, most commonly, sexual harassment is done by a man to a woman,"' 26 this
insight was rendered almost meaningless by the lack of discussion of its
relevance to the specific case. In summarizing the general nature of sexual
harassment, Justice Zamir explained, "Sexual harassment may be done by a
woman to a man, and sometimes between members of the same sex .... The
common denominator of all forms of sexual harassment is a behavior of a
sexual nature by one person which may offend the dignity of another
person."'
127
Employing genderless and neutral/individual rhetoric, the court presented
the group-based understanding of sexual harassment as insignificant, adding:
Sexual harassment crosses the boundary of free behavior, because free
behavior necessitates free will on both sides. Hence, sexual harassment
is always, in any social setting and anywhere reprehensible. It is
reprehensible because it is forced by one individual upon another
against his will in the sphere of sex, which by its nature is reserved,
above all other spheres, to mutual will. It is also reprehensible because
it confuses different categories-it treats an individual according to the
individual's sex in an offensive way, when the individual should be
treated according to his function or level of achievements in the
workplace or in the learning institution. It therefore offends not only
the principle of sex-based equality, but also the person's dignity."'
128
Here as well the court repeatedly referred to sexual harassment in
neutral/individual terms, characterizing it as an act of sexual nature targeting
any "person" on an individual basis. Though the court did eventually mention
that sexual harassment can also violate the principle of sex-based equality, this
mention did not lead the decision toward a more complex understanding of the
group-based aspects of the phenomenon. Instead, the role of gender equality in
defining sexual harassment remained unclear, while the individual, dignity-
based aspects of the phenomenon were greatly emphasized and elaborated.
The third element characterizing the basic understanding of harassment
that came to the fore in Ben-Asher was the identification of sexual harassment
exclusively as behavior of a sexual nature. Other gender-based forms of
hostility or abuse towards working women (or men) that are not sexual in
content but that still play a significant role in preserving the workplace as a
male-dominated domain were categorically excluded from the formal definition
of sexual harassment. 129 Having given several examples of behaviors that might
126. Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
129. The most comprehensive discussion of the nature of gender-based forms of harassment and
the distinction between such forms of behavior and sexuality-based harassment can be found in Vicki
Schultz's seminal work. Schultz has argued that much of the gender-based hostility and abuse that
women (and some men) endure at work is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor is it even
sexual in nature. Instead, many forms of harassment are actions designed to maintain work-particularly
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constitute sexual harassment, such as "talk suggestive of courtship"' 30 and
"requests or suggestions of a sexual nature,"' 131 Justice Zamir concluded that
"behavior does not constitute sexual harassment unless it is, by definition, of a
sexual nature. Thus, a particular behavior will not be considered sexual
harassment, even if it is harassing, if it is not of a sexual nature or is [not]
expressed in matters associated with sex."' 132 Moreover, the court held that the
central issue with which the courts must contend, for future application of the
Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law was "[w]hether a behavior of a sexual
nature crosses the boundary between the permitted and the prohibited area."'
133
As the first supreme court case that addressed the new legislation, Ben-
Asher became the guiding precedent for assessing claims of sexual harassment.
Frequently cited in later opinions, 34 Ben-Asher's three main themes have
become standard in the judicial discourse on this issue.
A fourth theme, incorporating moralistic, and at times patriarchal, content
in judicial analyses has since emerged. Instead of describing the dignitary harm
of sexual harassment in neutral/individual terms, the court diverted the legal
discussion of sexual harassment's harm to a new path in which the breach of
women's honor became the primary wrong of the phenomenon.
The court engaged in this heavily moralistic-patriarchal discourse on
sexual harassment in Galili.135 The case dealt with the promotion of a senior
military officer, Galili, who conducted an intimate sexual relationship with a
the more highly rewarded lines of work-as a bastion of masculine competence and authority. The
forms of such harassment are wide-ranging. They include denigrating women's performance or ability to
master the job; engaging in deliberate work sabotage; assigning women sex-stereotyped service tasks
that lie outside their job descriptions (such as serving coffee); and withholding training, information, or
opportunities to learn to do their jobs well. These forms of harassment are gender-based because they
play a significant role in preserving job segregation by constructing gender-based differences in work
competence. Schultz concludes that the problem of sexual harassment has to be re-conceptualized
broadly enough to include all forms of gender-based harassment and not only male-female sexual
advances. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
130. CSA 6713/96 Israel v. Ben-Asher [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 650, 662.
131. Id.
132. Id. at682.
133. Id. at 688.
134. For supreme court cases that cite Ben-Asher, see CertCrA 8059/06 John Doe v. Israel [20061
(unreported case); HCJ 6840/01 Feltzman v. Chief of Staff [2005] (unreported case); CSA 2203/05
Madar v. Civil Serv. Comm'n [2005] (unreported case); CSA 4790/04 Israel v. Ben-Chaim [2005] Pador
05(31) 557; CSA 6920/03 Cohen v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 655; HCJ 1435/03 Jane Doe v.
Disciplinary Ct. for Gov't Employees in Haifa [2003] lsrSC 58(1) 529; CSA 882/03 Ben-David v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n [2003] Tak-Al 2003(2) 3276; CSA 11025/02, 65/03 Eisner v. Israel [2003] lsrSC 57(5)
541; CSA 7113, 7233/02 Israel v. Levy [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 817; CSA 1599/03 Tapiro v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n [2003] IsrSC 58(2) 125; CSA 10088/02 Batzon v. Israel [2003] Tak-AI 2003(1) 1884; CSA
6737/02 Israel v. Zaken [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 312; CSA 5771/01 Podlovsky v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2001]
IsrSC 56(1) 463; CSA 1928/00 Israel v. Baruchin [2000] IsrSC 54(3) 694; HCJ 1284/99 Jane Doe v.
Chief of Staff [1999] IsrSC 53(2) 62. For a selection of lower court opinions that cite Ben-Asher, see
CrimC (PT) 6862/04 Israel v. Yulzari [2006] (unreported case); CrimC (PT) 1222/02 Israel v. Daka
[2006] (unreported case); Crim (Nz) 1161/06 Zayad v. Israel [2006] (unreported case); Crim (Jer)
9116/05 Shitrit v. Israel [2005] (unreported case); Crim (Hi) 2596/02 Israel v. Malka [2002] (unreported
case); Crim (TA) 71159/01 Israel v. Dahan [2002] (unreported case).
135. HCJ 1284/99 Jane Doe v. IDF Commander (Galili) [1999] IsrSC 53(2) 62.
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young female soldier who served as his secretary. The woman, who later
revealed that she was forced into this sexual relationship, petitioned the
supreme court and demanded that the officer's pending promotion to the rank
of general be halted. The court accepted her petition and ordered the military to
refrain from promoting the officer to a higher rank. Written after the 1998
legislation passed, Galili-like Ben Asher-dealt with incidents that occurred
before the enactment of the new law. Yet both the complainant and the military
referred to the alleged incidents as a form of sexual harassment and pointed to
the new legislation that was already in place as signifying a new era in Israeli
society's condemnation of this phenomenon. 136 The court similarly focused the
discussion on the sexual harassment of women in the military, and emphasized
the significance of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law in this context.137
In rationalizing and defending its decision prohibiting Galili's promotion,
the court relied excessively on moral grounds. Analyzing Galili's behavior
within the framework of the general prohibition against sexual harassment
anchored in the new legislation, 138 the court determined that the sexual
harassment of women in the military constitutes a moral harm. The court stated
that, in addition to its military skills, the power of the Israel Defense Forces
["IDF"] derives from its "moral strength."'139 Therefore, an appropriate ruling
regarding Brigadier General Galili had to take into account, inter alia, "the
utmost importance of preserving morality in the IDF ... and the necessity of
strengthening the public's trust in the IDF not only as an efficient body
professionally speaking, but as a body of credibility, [and] high moral standards
in general ... .,,140 The officer, whom the court noted was "married at the time
and the father of three," 14 1 was condemned by the court for "a grave moral
stain"142 upon his character, due to his "obnoxious and immoral conduct."
143
Consequently, the court concluded that the disciplinary measures already taken
against him by the military authorities were insufficient "to guarantee purifying
the atmosphere."' 44 Justice Turkel, who wrote a concurring opinion, repeatedly
referred to the notions of "purity" and "morality" when analyzing the incident
and its harms. He defined the respondent's actions as "profoundly
reprehensible from the moral viewpoint,"' 145 adding that:
136. Id. at 67-68.
137. Id. at 70-72.
138. After citing a statement from Ben-Asher on the severity of sexual harassment, the Galili court
added, "Lately this view [of severity] was given additional force in the Prevention of Sexual Harassment
Law-1998, that established sexual harassment as a special offense when it occurs in circumstances of
abuse of authority, inter alia in the framework of the military service . I..." Id. at 72.
139. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 66.
142. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 73.
145. Id. at 78.
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It was about acts such as these that the Bible spoke in reference to the
Israelite armies: "When you go out as a troop against your enemy, be
on your guard against anything untoward... . Since the Lord your
God moves about in your camp to protect you and to deliver your
enemies to you, let your camp be holy"... and let our camp be
146pure.
The words "pure" and "moral" occur, then, numerous times in various
forms throughout the Galili majority and concurring opinions. 147 Moreover,
when the court discussed the harms of sexual harassment in the military in
reference to the particular plaintiff, and women soldiers in general, the moral
dissection of the behavior was compounded by paternalistic language.
Referring to the plaintiff as "an inexperienced young woman soldier,"' 148 the
court explained that the officer's behavior violated men's duty to protect
women:
[T]he duty of loyalty that the commander in particular, and the army as
an institution, owe female recruits, their families and society in general
... encompasses the expectation from every commander carefully to
watch over the precious pledge entrusted to him-namely, the human
resource, and in the present case, the woman soldier.
149
By articulating the wrong in terms of its violation of a special protective
duty towards women as a group, the court diverted the discussion of sexual
harassment to a new path. In contrast to Ben-Asher's individual and gender-
neutral formulation of the dignitary harm of sexual harassment, Galili was very
specific about the gendered context. It was no longer a genderless "person"
who was harassed, but rather women as a group. Yet this diversion added an
even more troubling aspect to the discussion. While Ben-Asher replaced gender
equality with dignity and redefined the harm of sexual harassment in almost
solely dignitary terms, Galili provided a patriarchal account of sexual
harassment that in fact contradicted and undermined basic notions of gender
equality. The court went on to state:
The public which entrusts its daughters to the army must believe that
the IDF and its commanders will do all they can to ensure the welfare
of the woman soldier and guard her physical and mental well-being.
The woman soldier must know that the IDF is a safe place in which to
serve.
150
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Justice Strassberg-Cohen also stressed the need to strengthen the image of the military as an
institute of "high morality," and further explained that the strength of the military derives from its
"moral strength." Id. at 69. Justice Tirkel in his concurring opinion explained that he wished to add
something "on morality and values," and determined that the consent of the plaintiff "does not purify"
the deeds of the respondents. Id. at 77-78.
148. Id. at 70.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 73.
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In the view of the court, the central harm of sexual harassment was restricted to
paternalistic considerations designed to accommodate women's special need
for protection. As a result, the prevention of sexual harassment was re-
characterized as a moral necessity related to women's vulnerability rather than
to women's equal rights.
The fact that Galili not only excluded gender equality from the relevant
discourse on sexual harassment in the military, but also provided an account
that subverts basic notions of gender equality, is particularly troubling since it
initiated a more general discussion of sexual harassment in the military. While
the complainant focused mostly on the manner in which the officer's behavior
wronged her,151 the court justified its final decision on more general grounds
relating to the significance of sexual harassment in the military and its
particular harm. Under those circumstances, the discursive framework adopted
by the court had broader implications regarding the proper understanding of
sexual harassment in general and in the military in particular.
Given the IDF's male-dominated hierarchical structure,' 52 it is very
important to highlight the connection between its built-in gender inequality and
the prevalence of sexual harassment against women soldiers. Israel is the only
western democracy with compulsory conscription for both men and women.
Despite this formal egalitarian draft policy, the Israeli army is still an institution
where manhood, exclusively identified with power and authority, is the
norm. 153 Unlike men, women are easily exempted from military service on
grounds of marriage, pregnancy, motherhood, religious beliefs, or
conscientious objection. 54 Women serve a shorter term than men, and have
been traditionally excluded from combat roles. In recent years some combat
positions were redefined as gender integrated, but the presence of women in
151. Id. at 68.
152. Noya Rimalt, Women in the Sphere of Masculinity: The Double-Edged Sword of Women's
Integration in the Military, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1097 (2007).
153. See id.
154. See Defence Service Law [Consolidated Version] 5746-1986, 39 LSI 112 (1985-86) §§ 39-40
(Isr.). For the historical background of those legal exemptions, see Noya Rimalt, Equality with a
Vengeance: Female Conscientious Objectors in Pursuit of a Voice and Substantive Gender Equality, 16
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 97 (2007). Similar exemptions from regular and reserve military duty have not
been formulated for men. The only legal basis for exemption of this kind is found in another section of
the Defense Service Law of 1986, which grants the Minister of Defense general discretion to exempt "a
person of military age" from the duty to perform military service "for reasons connected with the
requirements of education, security, settlement or the national economy or for family or other reasons."
Defense Service Law § 36 (emphasis added). The relevant provisions of section 36 read:
The Minister of Defence may, by order, if he sees fit to do so for reasons connected with the
size of the regular forces or reserve forces of the Israel Defence Forces or for reasons
connected with education, security, settlement or the national economy or for family or other
reasons
(1) exempt a person of military age from the duty of regular service or reduce the
period of his service;
(2) exempt a person of military age from the duty of reserve service for a specific
period or absolutely.
Defense Service Law § 36.
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those roles is still marginal, 155 and the military remains highly segregated along
gender lines. Being a secretary in the military continues to be a predominantly
female experience, with one in every five women soldiers serving in this
traditionally female job. In contrast, commanding high-ranking officers are still
primarily male. In 2006, ninety-seven percent of the highest decision-making
positions in the military were filled by men.156 In light of this reality, the
gendered significance of Galili's behavior becomes more apparent. The woman
who filed the complaint against Brigadier Nir Galili served as his secretary to
fulfill part of her compulsory military service. The presence of women soldiers
who are subordinate to high ranking male officers is therefore not unusual or
incidental to the Israeli military. Recent data regarding the prevalence of sexual
harassment in the military indicates that the military is one of the most hostile
and demeaning places for women in the public sphere in terms of the intensity
of sexual harassment. 157 A 2004 survey conducted by the IDF itself revealed
that when women soldiers were asked about specific examples of harassment
such as humiliating sexual jokes and stories, seventy-six percent of female
officers and sixty-six percent of regular female soldiers reported that they were
subjected at least once to hostile environment sexual harassment. 158 Similarly
high figures were discovered with regard to sexual innuendo.159 Moreover, the
fact that a few women have managed to cross gender barriers in the military in
recent years and have volunteered for combat roles has not changed the
intensity of harassment they experience.' 60 Sexual harassment is a predominant
experience of many women soldiers, including those few who serve in more
"masculine" roles.' 6 1 In sum, sexual harassment constitutes a powerful example
of a patriarchal behavior that plays a part in the socialization process of young
male soldiers and contributes to the structural maintenance of military service
as a gender-biased system. Sexual harassment affects mostly women soldiers'
62
155. Rimalt, supra note 152, at 1113.
156. Id. at 1113-14.
157. SARIT AMRAM KATZ, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE IDF: RESEARCH AMONG
FEMALE SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS IN COMPULSORY SERVICE (2d ed. 2005), available at
http://www.aka.idf.il/SIPSTORAGE/files/ 2/47822.pdf.
158. Id. at 26.
159. Id. at 26.
160. Id.
161. For a detailed analysis of the nature and significance of those findings, see Rimalt, supra note
152; and Rimalt, supra note 52.
162. A 2001 survey of IDF soldiers reflect that one in five women in the IDF had been sexually
harassed. Moreover, the military's own findings indicate that most of the soldiers who are subject to
sexual harassment do not file an official complaint. Therefore the actual prevalence of the phenomenon
is much higher than the number of official complaints that are filed each year. KATZ, supra note 157;
Gideon Alon, A 78% Rise in Complaints of Sexual Harassment in the IDF in 2003, HAARETZ, available
at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtmlitemNo=428826&contrasslD=2&subContrasslD
=21&sbSubContrasslD=0 (last visited Nov. 29, 2007). In 1999, 436 soldiers filed official complaints
about sexual harassment: 9 men and 427 women. In 2002, the numbers were 209 women and 8 men, and
in 2003, 386 women and 17 men. The IDF: A 78% Rise in Complaints of Sexual Harassment, YNET
(Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2917767,00.htm. See also Protocol
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and serves as an effective tool for reminding Israeli women of their "proper
place" in society, perpetuating their image as sexual objects and hindering their
efforts to gain authority and power within the military.
As the first supreme court case aspiring to provide a general framework for
the analysis of sexual harassment in the military after the enactment of the new
law, Galili could have assessed the connection between this case and the
broader reality of gender inequality in the military. Because the court neglected
to assess this issue, the decision disguised the broader gendered picture within
which the severity of the Galili behavior should have been evaluated. The
court's decision in Galili, which sought to outline a general framework for the
discussion of sexual harassment in the military, therefore failed on two
significant accounts. First, by leaving the principle of gender equality out of the
discussion, it ignored an important concept for the analysis and understanding
of this social practice. Second, by supplementing the exclusion of equality
discourse with a conceptual reversal of the meaning of sexual harassment and
its injurious effect on women, it defined sexual harassment in anti-feminist
terms. Ben-Asher began the shift away from the original feminist rationale for
the law, by imbuing the concept of human dignity with gender-neutral,
individual content. Galili then added a further normative shift, depriving the
concept of human dignity of any liberal and egalitarian significance and
replacing it with moralistic and patriarchal notions of women's honor that
resonated with the old tradition of protecting women's honor against seducers.
Between Ben-Asher and Galili the dignitary harm of sexual harassment was
defined in two alternative manners--each problematic in its own way. Ben-
Asher conceptualized the dignitary harm of sexual harassment as a
genderless/individual harm that, when inflicted on a random victim, violates
this person's human dignity. In Galili, on the other hand, the dignitary harm of
harassment centered on a Victorian perception of women's honor and
connected sexual harassment to gendered codes of sexual purity. Neither
opinion linked the prevention of sexual harassment to society's commitment to
the promotion of gender equality and women's rights. Yet while Ben-Asher still
employed a rights discourse to explain the harm of harassment, Galili diverted
the focus to a patriarchal path, thereby promoting an understanding of sexual
harassment that is in fact demeaning to women.
Galili, like Ben-Asher, became an important source for reference in the
judicial discussion and analysis of sexual harassment.' 63 As will be discussed in
of the 47th Meeting of the 15th Knesset, Nov. 15, 1999 (on file with author) (discussing sexual
harassment of male soldiers).
163. See, e.g., HCJ 6840/01 Feltzman v. Chief of Staff. [2005] (unreported case); CSA 4790/04
Israel v. Ben-Chaim [2005] Pador 05(31) 557; CSA 1599/03 Tapiro v. Civil Serv, Comm'n [2003] lsrSC
58(2) 125; HCJ 4869/01 Jane Doe v. Military Advocate General [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 944; CA 1928/00
Israel v. Baruchin [2000] lsrSC 54(3) 694; CrimA (Hi) 2596/02 Israel v. Malka [2002] (unreported
case); CrimS (TA) 1037/01 Israel v. Machluf [2002] Tak-Mach 2002(1) 2507; CrimC (KS) 1342/00
Israel v. Dahan [2003] (unreported case).
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the next Section, alongside the analytic themes that were established in Ben-
Asher, the moralistic and patriarchal discourse has occupied a strong and
explicit place in court opinions after Galili, thus further promoting the anti-
equality interpretation of the dignitary harm of sexual harassment.
2. Subsequent Supreme Court Cases Further Establish and Develop the
Four Frames of Reference
Opinions handed down by the Supreme Court of Israel after Ben-Asher and
Galili illustrate and build upon the four central frames of reference that took
shape in those cases. Because the supreme court serves as an appellate court for
disciplinary procedures against state employees, the vast majority of supreme
court cases dealing with the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law concern
sexually harassing behaviors of state employees. 164 Israel v. Baruchin, for
example, concerned a senior official in the Ministry of Defense who, over a
period of three years, sexually harassed four women soldiers serving under his
supervision.' 65 Some female conscripts are assigned to various administrative
and secretarial civilian jobs in government offices that deal with security issues,
such as the Ministry of Defense or the Prime Minister's office. The result is
that state employees often serve as those women's direct supervisors; Baruchin
provides a typical example of this problematic working relationship. On its
face, the systematic pattern of harassment against several women in the same
workplace and in the context of clear power differences along gender lines
could have evoked a substantive discussion of sexual harassment's gendered
significance and harm. However, as in Ben-Asher and Galili, the court largely
avoided the link between sexual harassment and gender inequality. With the
exception of a quote from the explanatory note to the Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law, which included a reference to the principle of sex-based
equality, 166 the court diverted the judicial analysis of the dignitary harm of
sexual harassment away from equality and toward the two alternative
conceptual paths established by Ben-Asher and Galili.
164. CSA 6713/96 Israel v. Ben-Asher [1998] lsrSC 52(1) 650; CSA 2203/05 Madar v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n [2005] (unreported case); CSA 4790/04 Israel v. Ben-Chaim [2005] Pador 05(31) 557; CSA
6920/03 Cohen v. Israel [2004 lsrSC 58(3) 655; HCJ 1435/03 Jane Doe v. Disciplinary Court for Gov't
Employees [2003] lsrSC 58(1) 529; CSA 882/03 Ben-David v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2003] Tak-A1
2003(2) 3276; CSA 11025/02, 65/03 Eisner v. Israel [2003] IsrSC 57(5) 541; CSA 7113, 7233/02 Israel
v. Levy [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 817; CSA 1599/03 Tapiro v. Civil Serv. Comm'n [2003] IsrSC 58(2) 125;
CSA 10088/02 Bazon v. Israel [2003] Tak-Al 2003(1) 1884; CSA 6737/02 Israel v. Zaken [2003] lsrSC
57(2) 312; CSA 5771/01 Podlovsky v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2001] IsrSC 56(l) 463; CSA 1928/00 Israel
v. Baruchin [2000] IsrSC 54(3) 694.
165. CSA 1928/00 Israel v. Baruchin [2000] IsrSC 54(3) 694. Baruchin was indicted and convicted
for addressing sexual remarks to those female soldiers such as "what a nice ass you have" or "what a
sexy body." He also forcefully hugged and kissed those women on several occasions. Id. at 699.
166. Id. at 707.
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Most of the decision employs a gender-neutral/individual rhetoric,
repeatedly referring to sexual harassment as an offense against the dignity of a
genderless victim. For example, in order to stress the judiciary's commitment
to combating sexual harassment and clarifying the nature of this social practice,
Justice Zamir, the sole presiding judge in this case,1 67 quoted from an earlier
supreme court decision that dealt with sexual exploitation in the workplace:
It is an intolerable phenomenon, which is unfortunately widespread,
that employers and people in positions of power exploit their authority
over their subordinates for their own sexual benefit. The subordinates'
dependence on those people causes them real distress, and they often
submit and acquiesce in such conduct, which is not only reprehensible
and in poor taste, but humiliates the person that is subjected to it and
gravely offends this person's dignity and privacy.168
Further on, Justice Zamir reinforced his portrayal of sexual harassment as
affecting genderless individuals with a quote from his own decision in Ben-
Asher: "Nowadays, it is generally agreed.., that sexual harassment, in addition
to possibly causing material damage, offends against the person's dignity."169
Moreover, although the court formally acknowledged that the case involved the
harassment of several women, this did not lead to a recognition of the
significance of this gendered aspect of the case and did not change the court's
gender-neutral frame of analysis. The particular severity of the case was
explained by reference to the fact that several "persons" had been harassed such
that the cumulative individual injury was greater:
Even if each individual case of such harassment [of a single woman],
in the form of a hug or a kiss or a sexual remark, is not a grave
incident, the combination of incidents, one after the other, makes the
sexual harassment a gross and particularly humiliating behavior:
There is nothing in it of emotional closeness and mental affection, but
utterly demeans the person as an instrument of sexual stimulation and
satisfaction.
170
Theoretically speaking, it is entirely true, of course, that the sexual
harassment of every person is a degrading practice. However, the court in
Baruchin was not discussing sexual harassment in theory, but was referring to a
specific case with clearly gendered characteristics. This case was also not an
167. Disciplinary appeals are heard and decided by a sole presiding justice of the supreme court,
who usually hears all of those appeals brought during a certain period of time. Therefore, most of the
court opinions in this area were delivered by two justices: Justice Zamir, who decided these cases until
his retirement in 2001; and later by Justice Beinish, who was the senior female justice of the supreme
court and who is now the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel. While other justices have
contributed to the development of supreme court sexual harassment caselaw in cases such as Galili,
Zamir and Beinish have played the most significant role in this regard.
168. CSA 1928/00 Israel v. Baruchin [2000] lsrSC 54(3) 694, 707 (emphasis added) (citing CrimA
2695/93 Shiri v. Israel [1993] (unreported case)).
169. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 712 (emphasis added).
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isolated one. It followed two other supreme court sexual harassment cases with
similarly gendered characteristics, Ben-Asher and Galili. The pattern of
harassment that was evident in all three cases confirmed arguments that were
raised during the legislative deliberation over the Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law regarding the ways in which sexual harassment is especially
harmful to women. 171 Baruchin's systematic sexual harassment of several
women in the same workplace was especially serious not just because of the
cumulative individual injury, but also because of its wider implications for the
status of women as a group. It was not just an offense against "a person," and
another "person," and another "person," but an offense against women as
such-an important distinction that the court failed to make. Additionally, even
as an individual injury, the sexual harassment of a woman goes beyond
humiliation; it affects her autonomy in the workplace, restricts her
opportunities, and undermines her professional status. 172  Limiting the
discussion of injury not only to a genderless victim but also to the individual,
humiliating features of sexual harassment obscures and belittles much of its
harm.
Toward the end of the Baruchin decision, the court adopted the Galili
frame of reference, switching away from a gender-neutral/individual analysis of
the dignitary harm of harassment to a moralistic and patriarchal argument that
some circumstances of sexual harassment are worse than others because of
society's special protective duties towards certain groups of women. Following
various citations from Galili regarding society's obligation to guard and protect
its young daughters in the military, 173 the court explained the particular severity
of the sexual harassment of female soldiers in the following manner:
The female soldier might be seen by the male worker in the Ministry
[of Defense] as an easy prey for sexual satisfaction. Such a worker has
to know that sexual harassment of a female soldier is graver than
sexual harassment of a woman civilian: it undermines the [general]
attitude of trust and appreciation towards the military, not only on the
part of the woman soldier and her family but also on the part of the
171. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
172. This aspect of harm associated with sexual harassment is identified by Kathryn Abrams as one
important aspect that courts should consider in assessing sexual harassment cases. Specifically, Abrams
identifies four factors relating to the nature, harm, and effect of sexual harassment that a reasonable trier
of facts should be familiar with in order to assess the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in a particular
case: (1) sexual harassment interacts with other barriers in the workplace that marginalize women; (2)
women associate sexual harassment with "intimidation, objectification, and devaluation" when it occurs
in the workplace; (3) sexual harassment "produce[s] a range of effects on the work lives" of its targets,
effects that can alter their conditions of employment, their ability to chart a desired professional path,
and their self esteem; and (4) the target's response at the time of the harassment is rarely a good
indicator of whether the behavior was problematic or even whether the target felt distressed by the
conduct. Kathryn Abrams, The Reasonable Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law,
DISSENT, Winter 1995, at 48, 52-54. For further discussion of the gendered harm of sexual harassment,
see also Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, supra note 44, at 1184-88, 1218-20.
173. CSA 1928/00 Israel v. Baruchin [2000] lsrSC 54(3) at 712-13.
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wide leneral public and it [therefore] has the flavor of a breach of
trust. C
Thus, when finally attributing significance to the gender of Baruchin's victims,
the court reduced the discussion to an assertion that young women soldiers are
worthy of greater protection against harassment in order to preserve public trust
in the military. Just as in Galili, it was women's vulnerability rather than
women's basic rights that captured the discussion once the court integrated
gender into its analysis.
Baruchin's line of reasoning, which conceptualizes the dignitary harm of
sexual harassment either in moralistic terms deriving from patriarchal
perceptions of women or in gender-neutral and individual terms, is evident in
later supreme court cases, as are the two other themes of analysis. In Podlovsky
v. Civil Service Commissioner,i1 5 the court dealt again with a case that involved
an obviously gendered pattern of harassment. Podlovsky, who served at the
time as the head of a governmental advisory bureau for veterans, pretended to
be a sexologist and a psychologist to the women soldiers under his command.
He then urged them to discuss their sex lives with him, made sexual comments
to them, told them dirty jokes, harassed them physically, and created a sexual
and hostile environment in the office. Podlovsky, like Baruchin before it,
provides a typical example of the problematic effects that can arise within a
working relationship where state employees directly supervise women
conscripts. In assessing the appropriate disciplinary measures to be taken
against the harasser, Justice Beinish stated:
Blatant sexual expressions that offend the dignity of women, especially
when uttered before young women soldiers who have to contend with
a new world, facing the power and authority of a command hierarchy,
are a grave offense . .. . The creation of a setting and conditions that
encouraged the women soldiers to discuss with him their sex life,
produced in the office a coarse and vulgar atmosphere that offended
against the human dignity of the women soldiers in his company.
176
Throughout her opinion, Justice Beinish alternately referred to the women
soldiers who had been harassed as "girls" 177 and as "young girls,"'1 78 thereby
conflating, as in Galili, the severity of the offense with the young age of the
victims, infantilizing the women and presenting them as particularly vulnerable
and in need of special protection. Here, too, all considerations of gender
equality and the status of women in the military were left out of the court's
discussion. Moreover, reemphasizing Ben-Asher's holding regarding the
inherently sexual nature of the prohibited harassment under the law, the
174. Id. at 713.
175. CSA 5771/01 Podlovsky v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2001] IsrSC 56(1) 463.
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Podlovsky court connected the defendant's actual acts of harassment, which in
this case were overtly sexual, to the fundamental purpose of the Prevention of
Sexual Harassment Law. Specifically, the court explained that the law's
specific definitions of various forms of sexual harassment "suggest that the
legislation sought to define a broad spectrum of cases in which expressions of a
sexual nature would be regarded as sexual harassment."179 This case
ultimately centered on the "sex" in harassment and the young age of the
harassed women as the primary relevant factors for an assessment of the
harmful consequences of the specific incidents of harassment. Combining
Galili's patriarchal conceptualization of the dignitary harm of harassment with
Ben-Asher's understanding of sexual harassment as involving solely sexual
behavior, Podlovsky reinforced the moralistic interpretation of the wrong of
sexual harassment by creating a normative link between "sex" and the violation
of young women's honor.
Another illustration of the problematic implications of judicial treatment of
sexual harassment can be found in Israel v. Levi. 18 The case, like Baruchin and
Podlovsky, concerned a state employee, a senior figure in the Ministry of
Defense, who sexually harassed a woman who served in his division, first as a
soldier and then as a civilian. 81 The opinion, delivered again by Justice
Beinish, revealed that the harassing incidents took place throughout the entire
period of the complainant's employment at the Ministry, and occurred in
almost every professional interaction she had with her harassing boss. 182 In
summarizing the relevant events, the court concluded that each time the female
soldier tried to perform her professional tasks, her boss diverted the interaction
between them to sexual matters, with the woman's sexuality being the main
criteria for defining and assessing her performance in the workplace.183 When
she tried to provide him a report at the end of each night shift, for instance, he
made sexual remarks to her, thereby undermining her effort to assert a
professional rather than a sexual identity at work. When the female employee
could no longer tolerate the continuing acts of harassment and the hostile
working environment it created for her, she left her job. What started as an
empowering process for a woman soldier who was assigned as part of her
compulsory military service to the prestigious, male-dominated Ministry of
Defense, i1 4 and who subsequently won a desirable position in the same office
179. Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
180. CSA 7113, 7233/02 Israel v. Levi [2003] lsrSC 57(3) 817, 823-25.
181. Shachar Levi was originally indicted on three counts of sexual harassment that involved three
different women. He was eventually convicted of sexually harassing only one woman. The court
determined that his relationship with the first complainant was consensual, and the second complainant
failed to show up for hearings. Id. at 817.
182. Id, at 836.
183. Id, at 833.
184. Levi was decided in 2003. In that year, the Ministry of Defense employed 656 employees in
managerial positions, only twenty-six percent of whom were women. Moreover, most of these women
were at the bottom of the managerial pyramid, occupying the least prestigious management positions.
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after her military service came to an end, culminated in a process of alienation
that damaged her professional trajectory and self esteem and caused her to quit
her civilian job.
Levi illustrates a common problem: Women who venture into male-
dominated workplaces are often not welcomed but instead treated as a threat
and subjected to sexual harassment that creates a hostile and demeaning work
environment for them. In circumstances where this harassment eventually
drives the women to quit, the male domination of that workplace is reinforced
and gender segregation between careers is further perpetuated. The link
between hostile work environment sexual harassment and job segregation on
the basis of gender is documented in feminist literature' 85 and has been
recognized by a number of American courts. 186 Hence, for a proper
understanding of the gendered significance of the various incidents of
harassment that occurred in Levi it is important to recognize that the harassment
of the female employee eventually played a role in preserving the masculine
image of a traditionally segregated workplace.'
87
Although the court mentioned that the female employee eventually quit her
job, the court avoided any further reference to the meaning and possible
implications of that fact. Instead, the court focused its discussion of harm on
the fact that the female employee was a particularly young and physically weak
woman who had suffered several years earlier from anorexia, 188 explaining:
"[Levi] misused his authority on [the complainant] ... despite [her] young
age.., and in spite of him being aware of her heightened vulnerability because
of the illness she struggled with in the past."189 While Levi's harassing
behavior forced the complainant to quit her job, exemplifying the relationship
between sexual harassment and the exclusion of women from male dominated
jobs, when summarizing Levi's wrongdoing, Justice Beinish chose to
emphasize over and over again the woman's "heightened vulnerability" and
Levi's disregard of this physical weakness:
The sexual remarks of the appellant were directed toward [the
complainant and] were repeated over several months. This, despite his
senior position as a supervisor and in spite of his being aware of her
young age .... What makes it most severe is that the appellant was
aware of [the victim's] heightened vulnerability due to the illness she
The deputy manager was a man and so were thirteen out of fifteen heads of departments. The third
highest ranking job level in the Ministry, that of deputies to the heads of departments, consisted of
thirty-eight men and seven women. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, STATE OF ISRAEL, 2003 REPORT OF
THE DEPARTMENT FOR THE PROMOTION AND INTEGRATION OF WOMEN (Ya'akov Berger & Rivka
Shacked eds., 2004).
185. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 68, at 16; Schultz, supra note 129, at 1756-61.
186. See Schultz, supra note 129, at 1769-74.
187. See supra note 185 and sources cited therein.
188. Earlier in the opinion, the court explained that the complainant suffered from anorexia at the
age of fourteen. CSA 7113, 7233/02 Israel v. Levi [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 817, 834.
189. Id. at 836 (emphasis added).
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struggled with in her past, but nevertheless did not refrain from
addressing sexual remarks to her.
1 90
Ultimately, the gravity of the harasser's behavior was explained as relative
to the particular vulnerability of the complainant. He was not disciplined for
undermining her professional status and equal opportunity in the workplace,
but rather for being insensitive in addressing sexual remarks to a young and
physically weak woman. This conclusion blunts the unequivocal message that
the court should have issued concerning the gravity of the sexual harassment by
a male supervisor of a female employee in a male-dominated workplace.
Irrespective of the past illness of the particular victim, the various incidents of
harassment clearly constituted gender discrimination. Diverting the focus of the
discussion to the victim's specific weakness obscured a crucial gendered harm
that was clearly evident in this case; the court also re-characterized the entire
case as an unfortunate, almost random, incident relating to a particularly
helpless woman who was wronged by being subjected to an improper sexual
behavior.
A similar disregard of the relationship between sexual harassment and
gender inequality is evident in Zarzar v. Civil Service Commissioner.'9' The
case applied Galili's moralistic frame of reference, in which the exposure of a
woman to an expression of sexual desire was perceived as the core of the
offense under the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, and supplemented
this patriarchal conceptualization of the harm of harassment with a
natural/biological reference to the harassing behavior itself that further
disparaged the significance of this practice and its harm.
For many years, Zarzar had been in charge of the Office of Public
Complaints and was a chief investigator at the Ministry of Transport. He was
accused and convicted of sexually harassing a woman who came to his office to
lodge a complaint against a taxi driver. Zarzar hugged, kissed, and touched the
voman's body without her consent. The disciplinary court 192 ordered his
dismissal from the civil service, giving the following rationale, which was cited
verbatim by the supreme court in its ruling on the appeal: "Instead of doing his
work honestly and investigating the complainant's complaint ... [the accused]
made a mockery of his role and gave free rein to his lust, committing acts upon
the complainant's body which today are defined as sexual harassment."' 193 The
court's discussion of Zarzar's offense attributed the sexually harassing behavior
to his failure to "rein" in his sexual impulses, thereby implicitly portraying the
incident as natural, if at times inappropriate. Instead of defining the relevant
190. Id. at 845.
191. CSA 309/01 Zarzarv. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2001] lsrSC 55(2) 830.
192. In matters relating to disciplinary offenses including sexual harassment state employees are
tried before the Disciplinary Court for State Employees. The supreme court serves as an appellate court
for those rulings. See supra notes 114, 167 and accompanying text.
193. CSA 309/01 Zarzar v. Civil Serv. Comm'r (2001] IsrSc 55(2) 830, 835.
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incident of harassment as an assertion of power in the context of unequal
gender relations, it was portrayed as an act resulting simply from the harasser's
human (natural or biological) weakness.' 94 Hence, by presenting sexual
harassment as resulting from natural instincts rather than the product of socially
constructed choices, the court provided a portrayal of sexual harassment that
made it more socially acceptable.
In considering the proper disciplinary measures that should be taken
against the harasser, the supreme court noted that:
[The disciplinary court] has come to the conclusion that removing the
accused from the civil service demonstrates the principal purpose of
disciplinary action-the preservation of the image and moral decency
of the public service.195
In the supreme court's opinion, which embraced the disciplinary court's entire
ruling, Zarzar was punished for "giving free rein to his lust" in the presence of
the complainant, thereby injuring "the moral decency" of public service.
Hence, the court not only excluded the goal of promoting gender equality from
the relevant scope of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law-it also tied
the law's objective to moralistic considerations that replicate Galili's
patriarchal frame of reference. The question of what makes sexual harassment
such a grave offense was ultimately resolved again by an implicit reference to
sex, morality, and women's honor.
The court further consolidated these themes in the case of Eliezer
Hamani, 196 who, prior to retiring, had been a deputy auditor in the Ministry of
Religious Affairs. For several years, Hamani subjected a subordinate female
employee to acts and expressions of a sexual nature. However, the Disciplinary
Court for State Employees decided that those acts did not constitute sexual
harassment, because the harasser and the complainant appeared to be in a close
relationship during the relevant period, and because the complainant did not
resist the defendant's behavior. Therefore, with regard to most of the alleged
incidents, Hamani was not convicted of sexual harassment. Instead, the
disciplinary court determined that, in his sexual behavior, Hamani, a state
employee, undermined the reputation and public image of the civil service, and
it was for this offense that he was disciplined. The court did, however, conclude
that Hamani deserved to be convicted of sexual harassment in one specific
incident, which occurred "in public" when the complainant was speaking with
another female employee. According to the court's description of the
194. This natural/biological approach to sexual harassment is not new or unique. Catherine
MacKinnon points out that early American cases that rejected sexual harassment claims altogether did
so based on the idea that biology cannot be questioned or changed. She further explains: "In the
biological view, sexual expression seems presumed to derive from a biological need or genital drive or
to be rooted deeply in a natural order that connects biological differences with expressions of mutual
attraction." MACKINNON, supra note 68, at 91.
195. CSA 309/01 Zarzar v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2001] lsrSc 55(2) 830, 835 (emphasis added).
196. CSA 2168/01 Hamani v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2001] IsrSC 55(5) 949.
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occurrence, Hamani "grabbed [the complainant's] breast in his hand and told
her he loved it. The complainant slapped away his hand and asked that he stop
such acts. The appellant removed his hand from her breast, then touched her
genitals through her dress."' 97 The disciplinary court determined that this
incident was "exceptional and extraordinary even in that close relationship,"'
198
and therefore deserved the title of sexual harassment.
On appeal, Justice Beinish upheld both parts of the disciplinary court's
decision, affirming that the main harm Hamani's actions caused was damage to
the image and reputation of the civil service. Justice Beinish noted that:
Behavior in the workplace characterized by remarks of a sexual nature,
open acts of a sexual nature, touching, and acts carried out in public
and routinely [directed] to a woman employee at her place of work, is
a behavior that gives rise to an atmosphere that is inappropriate in the
civil service ... It got to the point that the man who ran the canteen for
years said in his testimony that fit is] "hard to believe that this is the
Ministry of Religious Affairs."'
199
Neither the disciplinary court nor the supreme court critically examined the
power relations between Hamani, a powerful senior official in the Ministry of
Religious Affairs, and the subordinate woman employee, nor did they analyze
the possible nature and consequences of such harassment. Rather, both courts
contented themselves with a discussion of the importance of preserving moral
decency in public service. The sole criterion used to identify the single incident
defined as sexual harassment was its extreme sexual crudeness, which was
described as "exceptional" and "extraordinary." In this context, as in Ben-
Asher, the judicial condemnation of the described behavior focused on its
sexual and public nature, leading to the conclusion that the core of the problem
was the exposure of the woman to sex.
3. Recent Developments in Supreme Court Caselaw
The four frames of analysis adopted by the supreme court regarding sexual
harassment repeatedly surface in more recent cases. Moreover, as time goes on,
the problematic implications of these frames of analysis have intensified. For
example, while in Ben-Asher and other cases such as Baruchin that followed
soon after, the principle of gender equality was at least mentioned as
marginally relevant to the understanding and analysis of sexual harassment, in
current opinions, the judicial discussion of sexual harassment portrays the
offense solely in dignitary terms.
197. Id. at 951.
198. Id. at 952.
199. Id. at 960.
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Israel v. Ben-Haim2 0 0 clearly demonstrates the establishment of an
exclusively dignitary paradigm of sexual harassment in contemporary judicial
discourse. Ben-Haim, like almost all reported sexual harassment cases that have
been heard by the Supreme Court of Israel since the 1998 law was passed,
involved a man who abused his authority and sexually harassed a female in the
context of clear power differences along gender lines.201 In this regard, the
case, decided in 2005, followed a long line of opinions that revealed a similarly
gendered pattern of harassment. Serving as a manager with the Postal Service,
Ben-Haim demanded sexual favors from a temporary female employee,
promising to improve her working terms and conditions in exchange.
Nevertheless, when explaining why the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law
specifically prohibits the kind of acts committed by Ben-Haim, Justice Beinish
adopted gender-neutral language and excluded gender equality from the
relevant framework of analysis. Portraying sexual harassment as a social
phenomenon that commonly involved "one person" who imposes his or her
will on "another person," she further identified human dignity and autonomy as
the central values that the new legislation aimed to protect:
The actions defined in section 3(a) to the law are prohibited because
they refer to circumstances in which one person imposes his/her will
on another person. These circumstances involve a violation of a
person's dignity and autonomy in the context of his/her sexuality.
Human dignity and autonomy are therefore the main values that the
Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law intends to protect.
20 2
Further on in her opinion, Justice Beinish noted that sexual harassment
commonly occurs in the context of abuse of authority. 203 However, she did not
mention that, in the vast majority of sexual harassment cases, this abuse of
authority has clearly gendered characteristics. She ignored the gendered and
group patterns of behavior that connected Ben-Haim to previous supreme court
cases. This frame of analysis neutralized and individualized the relevant
200. CSA 4790/04 Israel v. Ben-Chaim [2005] Pador 05(31) 557.
201. For supreme court sexual harassment cases that were heard and decided before Ben-Chaim
and exemplify the gendered pattern described above, see CSA 6920/03 Cohen v. Israel [2004] lsrSC
58(3) 655; CSA 1599/03 Tapiro v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2003] lsrSC 58(2) 125; CSA 11025/02, 65/03
Eisner v. Israel [2003] IsrSC 57(5) 541; CSA 7113, 7233/02 Israel v. Levy [2003] lsrSC 57(3) 817; HC
4869/01 Jane Doe v. Military Advocate General [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 944; CSA 8431/01 Israel v. Danino
[2001] IsrSC 56(2) 577; CSA 5771/01 Podlovsky v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2001] IsrSC 56(1) 463; CSA
1928/00 Israel v. Baruchin [2000] IsrSC 54(3) 694; HC 1284/99 Jane Doe v. Chief of Staff [1999] IsrSC
53(2) 62; CSA 6713/96 Israel v. Ben-Asher [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 650; CSA 2868/04 Shamian v. Civil
Serv. Comm'r [2004] Pador 04(8) 764; CSA 882/03 Ben-David v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2003] Tak-Al
2003(2) 3276; CSA 10088/02 Bazon v. Israel [2003] Tak-Al 2003(1) 1884; HC 6840/01 Feltzman v.
Chief of Staff [2005] (unreported case); CSA 2203/05 Madar v. Comm'r of Civil Serv. [2005]
(unreported case); CSA 10575/03 Ben-David v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2004] (unreported case); CSA
10728/02 Asadi v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2003] (unreported case); CSA 1934/03 Falach v. Civil Serv.
Comm'r [2003] (unreported case). The few remaining supreme court cases also involved a male
harassing a female, but there was no formal status difference between the two.
202. CSA 4790/04 Israel v. Ben-Chaim [2005] Pador 05(31) 557, at *3.
203. Id. at *4.
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incident of harassment and disassociated its harms from the broader, gendered
context in which those harms occurred. As a result, Ben-Haim was found guilty
and disciplined only for imposing his will on "another person" in a manner that
violated that "person's dignity and autonomy."
Similarly, the court justified Samuel Bazon's dismissal from public service
in Israel v. Bazon with gender-neutral rhetoric, rather than by highlighting the
particularly severe gendered aspects of his acts.20 4 Bazon, a powerful manager
with the Employment Service, sexually harassed a temporary female employee
both verbally and physically. Fully aware of his victim's economic hardship-
she was an immigrant, recently widowed, and in dire need of a permanent
position-he persuaded her to give him her telephone number, promising to
extend her term of employment. Later, he repeatedly harassed her over the
205phone, intimidating her at home as well as at work. Summarizing its reasons
for choosing a deterrent punishment, the court avoided any reference to the
significance and implications of the gendered context of this case, and
explained that "[t]he scope of the phenomenon of sexual harassment, and
specifically the injury to the dignity and status of the victims of those offenses,
as well as the injury to the image of civil service and to relations in the
workplace, justify the delivery of a deterring message. 20 6
This exclusively gender-neutral conclusion regarding the particular harm of
sexual harassment in civil service was repeated in Israel v. Zaken, 20 which
involved a male state employee who sexually harassed a female colleague. In
articulating the wrong of sexual harassment, the court concluded: "When the
sexual harassment is exercised between state employees it harms the
environment in the workplace, disrupts work relations, and even harms the
proper function of the civil service and its appropriate image."
20 8
These cases reveal that the relationship between gender inequality and
sexual harassment has been completely excluded from the Israeli Supreme
Court's contemporary legal discourse on sexual harassment. The court not only
refrains from mentioning equality as a relevant value in this context, but the
discriminatory harms of sexual harassment are clearly not part of the court's
substantive understanding of this social practice, despite the systematic picture
of subordination on the basis of gender that surfaces in each supreme court case
reviewed here.
The problematic implications of this frame of analysis-which ignores the
manner in which power differences and gender coincide in sexual harassment
cases-are especially evident in recent supreme court cases that deal with
204. CSA 10088/02 Bazon v. Israel [2003] Tak-AI 2003(1) 1884.
205. Id. § 1.
206. Id. § 5.
207. CSA 6737/02 Israel v. Zaken [2002] IsrSC 57(2) 312.
208. Id. at 336.
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situations of systematic harassment of several women in the same workplace. 20 9
In Baruchin, when the court first faced a situation of systematic harassment
along gender lines, the court reinforced the gender-neutral perspective and
focused its discussion on the fact that several individual dignitary offenses were
210
committed, rather than only one. In contrast, in some subsequent cases that
discuss similar incidents of systematic harassment--especially those involving
young women-the multiplicity of female victims has led the Israeli Supreme
Court to intensify Galili's moralistic and paternalistic frame of reference. In
Eisner,211 for instance, where a high school teacher sexually harassed at least
six of his female students, Justice Beinish chose patriarchal language, rather
than an equality-based analysis, to address the offense. Instead of connecting
the facts of the case explicitly or implicitly to questions of gender equality in
education, the court highlighted the special need to protect female school
students from sexual conduct that is inappropriate for a dignified school
teacher:
[S]exual conduct within a relationship between a male teacher and
female students is perceived as much more severe than sexual
harassment between workers in the workplace .... The public's trust in
the educational system might be destroyed if a teacher who betrayed
this trust remains in his job .... One should hope that the appellant,
who continues to work as a teacher, internalized the message that the
disciplinary measures are designed to convey... and will be deterred
in the future from any expression of an offending sexual nature and
inappropriate conduct, in order to preserve and maintain in a dignified
manner his status as a teacher.
212
At the end of the day, Alon Eisner was condemned and punished for
undermining public trust in the educational system and for breaking civility
codes to which a school teacher should conform, especially in relation to
female students. Questions about the basic rights of those female students were
left out of the discussion.
The court's repeated emphasis on the sexual content of the harassment is
another theme which has become more apparent in recent cases. This theme,
which first appeared in Ben-Asher, has been taken to support the proposition
that sexual harassment should be identified based on the apparent sexual
motivation and desire of the harasser, in addition to the sexual content of the
209. See, e.g., CSA 1599/03 Tapiro v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2003] IsrSC 58(2) 125; CSA 8431/01
Israel v. Danino [2001] IsrSC 56(2) 577; CSA 2868/04 Shamian v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2004] Pador
04(8) 764; CSA 882/03 Ben-David v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2003] Tak-AI 2003(2) 3276.
210. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
211. CSA 11025/02, 65/03 Eisner v. Israel [2003] IsrSC 57(5) 541.
212. Id. at 552. Eisner was convicted for three of the six alleged incidents of sexual harassment.
Yet since those incidents were not defined as very severe, he was not removed from public service and
was only transferred to another school and subjected to some additional disciplinary measures.
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behavior itself. 213 In its efforts to identify prohibited forms of harassment, the
court not only focuses on the "sexual" in sexual harassment, but also limits the
scope of its inquiry to whether the harassment was driven by sexual motivation.
As a result, other potentially relevant motivations triggering instances of sexual
harassment, such as hostility towards women, are automatically excluded from
the discussion. 214 The case of Ben-David v. Civil Service Commissioner offers
an extreme illustration of this line of analysis and of its detrimental
consequences for women. 2 15 Ben-David, a senior official in the Land Tax
Department at the Ministry of Treasury, was accused of sexually harassing
three women employees in his department. With regard to one incident, it was
determined that his acts did not constitute sexual harassment. In this incident,
Ben-David offered one of the complainants a lift home late at night at the end
of an after work social event. On the way, he drove to the beach despite the
complainant's protests. He stopped there for a few moments and finally took
the complainant home.2 16 The disciplinary court acquitted Ben-David of this
charge of sexual harassment, arguing that "the incident had no sexual
connotation, and therefore even if the appellant's behavior was reprehensible
on the personal level, it did not constitute a disciplinary offense [of sexual
harassment]. ' 17 The employee was denied relief solely because the alleged act
of harassment and intimidation committed by her boss was not found by the
court to have a sexual overtone and motivation. Similarly, regarding an incident
in which Ben-David called another female subordinate "an idiot," shouted at
her "get out of my sight," and threatened to throw a stapler at her, he was
charged not with sexual harassment but with an offense of misconduct between
civil servants, again because of the non-sexual nature of the alleged
218behavior. Where a certain act of harassment did not meet the double criteria
of sexual content and sexual desire, the court automatically excluded it from
the purview of the law, thereby avoiding any attempt to examine whether
alternative parameters such as the gendered significance or consequences of the
harassment could assist in defining those acts as gender-based harassment.
Hostile environment sexual harassment frequently has the aim or effect of
denigrating the harassee's competence at work and it often has a clearly
gendered connotation. Calling a female employee "an idiot," "dumb," or
"stupid" perpetuates patriarchal stereotypes regarding women's low intellectual
213. See, e.g., CSA 882/03 Ben-David v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [20031 Tak-Al 2003(2) 3276; CSA
6920/03 Cohen v. Israel [2004] lsrSC 58(3) 655.
214. Vicki Schultz argues that many instances of sexual harassment are not driven by desire for
sexual relations and are not even sexual in nature. Instead many forms of gender based harassment are
driven by sheer hostility toward women and are designed to maintain the workplace as a masculine
domain. For elaboration of this claim, see generally Schultz, supra note 129.
215. CSA 882/03 Ben-David v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2003] Tak-Al 2003(2) 3276.
216. Id. § I.
217. Id. § 3 (emphasis added).
218. Id.
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capacities and presents women as professionally incompetent. Therefore, if the
sexual focus is abandoned and instead courts examine in every particular
situation whether the conduct had "the purpose or effect of undermining the
woman's right to participate in the workplace on an equal footing, '2 19 new
forms of gender-based harassment such as Ben-David's behaviors may come to
light.
In a similar manner, the case of Dr. Abraham Cohen, 220 who was in charge
of research at the Ministry of Science and who repeatedly harassed his assistant
(a Ph.D. student who was hired on a temporary basis), 221 focused exclusively
on his sexual intentions and the sexual nature of the behavior. The harasser
claimed that all his sexual gestures were motivated by friendship and affection
toward the complainant 222 but the court rejected this claim. With regard to a
particular event in which the harasser tried to kiss the complainant against her
will, the court determined that "this event raises no doubt as to the real [sexual]
intentions of the appellant and the true interpretation of his acts." 223 On the
other hand, with regard to a different incident in which, during a mutual train
ride to a conference in Germany, the harasser touched the complainant's knee,
the court determined that this touching was not sexually motivated and
therefore decided to acquit the defendant on that count of the indictment. The
court did not address the fact that, irrespective of his sexual desires, the
harasser created a hostile working environment for the complainant, in which
various forms of harassment tainted almost every professional interaction she
had with her supervisor.224 All that was perceived relevant for the disciplinary
conviction and for its approval by the supreme court was that certain incidents
of harassment were sexual and sexually motivated.
Contemporary judicial discussion of sexual harassment excludes in
advance the possibility of defining other expressions of hostility toward women
as gender harassment, and leaves various forms of harassment with clear
gendered characteristics beyond the reach of the law and its enforcement.
219. Schultz, supra note 129, at 1801-02.
220. CSA 6920/03 Cohen v. Israel [2004] lsrSC 58(3) 655.
221. Id. at 657.
222. Id. at 659.
223. Id. at 661.
224. The defendant was convicted on three counts of the disciplinary indictment. According to the
first count, he sexually harassed the complainant during many car rides they took together for
professional purposes. During those rides he used to make comments to her such as "How beautiful you
are" and "It is so pleasant to work with you" while touching and petting her arm. He did so despite the
fact that the complainant told him several times she did not feel comfortable with his behavior.
According to the second count of the indictment, when hosting a scientific delegation from Germany,
the defendant invited her to his hotel room to freshen up before dinner. He promised not to enter the
room while she was there, but broke his promise and tried to kiss her against her will. According to the
third count, he tried to kiss her on her cheek during a ride to a professional meeting at one of the
universities.
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B. Sexual Harassment Caselaw in Lower Courts
Paralleling the opinions of the supreme court that have interpreted the
Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law and determined the parameters of its
application, a broad and detailed body of opinions has been issued by the lower
courts. In these opinions, which have accumulated in the course of criminal
proceedings, disciplinary proceedings against state employees, proceedings in
labor courts, and even in tort cases, we encounter four discursive themes
similar to those found in the supreme court caselaw. Occasionally, lower courts
quote the preamble to the law, which mentions the principle of equality as
relevant to the discussion of sexual harassment, but substantially, the concept
of dignity rules supreme in defining the significance and nature of the offense
of sexual harassment. The dignitary paradigm of sexual harassment ranges
from gender-neutral/individual analyses of sexual harassment to a definition
that moralizes and stereotypes women. Finally, in adhering to the restricted
'sexual' definition of sexual harassment, lower courts identify and condemn
sexual harassment only when it is a sexual behavior motivated by sexual desire.
For example, in Israel v. Rias,225 an executive manager of a factory
harassed five women workers. Here, the magistrate court adopted the
neutral/individual frame of analysis when referring to Rias's behavior:
"[O]ffenses of this kind must be uprooted by means of a deterring and painful
punishment, in order to demonstrate society's detestation of such acts, which
harm the dignity of the other person's body and his/her freedom to choose with
whom to make love."
226
Likewise, in Tzabari,227 involving a senior manager in the publishing
department of the Ministry of Defense who harassed four women employees
under his authority, the appellate court upheld Tzabari's conviction and the
punishment he received, stating:
The workplace is where a person spends a large portion of one's day
and time. The person is entitled to do so in a neutral atmosphere,
"free" of sexual connotations. The person must not be subjected to the
views and preferences of another worker, who seeks to derive from an
"atmosphere" of his/her own making opportunities for exploitation of
the other and an offense against the other's values.
228
Conversely, at the moralistic and stereotypical end of the spectrum are
opinions such as that in the matter of Yitzhak Iluz,229 who served as adjutant in
the Southern Command of the IDF and who sexually harassed several women
soldiers under his command. When the Military Court of Appeals dealt with
225. CrimC (BS) 1451/01 Israel v. Rias [2001] Tak-Shal 2001(3) 52.
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. CrimC (TA) 1034/00 Israel v. Tzabari [2003] (unreported case).
228. CrimA (TA) 71609/03 Tzabari v. Israel [2004] Pador 04(8) 282.
229. A 51/01 lluz v. Gen. Military Prosecutor [2001] Pador 01(6) 100.
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this case, it resorted to the narrow and problematic connection between sex and
women's honor:
We are weary of speaking about the severity with which it is
imperative to regard the actions of commanders who exploit the status
and authority they possess to make free with the bodies of women
soldiers, be they NCOs or officers, in a way which offends the
woman's dignity and constitutes a humiliating invasion of the
individual's space. It is intolerable that commanders give free rein to
their impulses by committing obscene acts against women serving in
the IDF.
30
The military court's decision in Iluz implicitly associated the indecent
aspects of sexual behavior with its humiliating impact on women. As in
Zarzar,231 the portrayal of the harasser as somebody who simply gave in to a
human weakness reduced the significance of the harassment and disguised the
elements of power and subordination involved. This not only perpetuated
patriarchal notions regarding women's desired sexual purity, but also led to a
very narrow and misleading understanding of the consequences of the pattern
of harassment to which those women were subjected. The specific facts of the
case indicate that Iluz was responsible for training the complainants and testing
them in their work. He also served as their liaison with IDF headquarters, such
that they could not perform their duties properly without his assistance, which
he gave in exchange for sexual favors.232 The harassing behavior therefore
undermined the women's professional status in the military. They were
deprived of the opportunity to win professional respect and promotion on the
basis of their skills and abilities, and their entire professional competence in the
military was reduced to that of a sexual object. In the court's opinion, all these
detrimental and clearly gender-based consequences were reduced to the single
conclusion that what was essentially intolerable was the fact that Iluz
committed humiliating "obscene acts" against those women.
Similarly, in Harush v. Israel,233 in which the Deputy Director of the Fund
for the Promotion of Construction in Israel was convicted of sexually harassing
one of his female secretaries, the appellate court stressed the "humiliation...
caused by the appellant's behavior." 234 The court further explained that
"[p]recisely in light of the senior position of the appellant, he should have
avoided giving free rein to his desires, and exploiting his position in the
workplace in a manner that offended the complainant's honor."235 This judicial
account of the harm of sexual harassment exclusively in terms of dignity and
honor once again restricted the discussion to the indecency of the harasser and
230. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
231. CSA 309/01 Zarzar v. Civil Serv. Comm'r [2001] lsrSC 55(2) 830.
232. A 51/01 lluz v. Gen. Military Prosecutor [2001] Pador 01(6) 100, at *1.
233. CrimA (TA) 70818/01 Harush v. Israel [2001] Tak-Mah 2001(4) 993.
234. Id. § 12.
235. Id. (emphasis added).
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the humiliation of the victim, while disregarding the significance of the fact
that the various incidents of harassment eventually caused the woman to quit
236her job. Here too, instead of a complex discussion of the link between the
specific incidents of sexual harassment and the structural and discriminatory
injury to the woman's position in the workplace, the judicial analysis trivialized
the phenomenon and obscured some of its more detrimental consequences.
Indeed, as lower courts deal with more cases of sexual harassment, sexual
harassment is further trivialized and decontextualized in a manner that creates a
widening gap between the specific, gendered realities that characterize each of
those cases and the judicial analysis and understanding of those realities.
Amir Aharoni, for instance, served as a military policeman with the Border
Control Unit,237 a predominately male unit that started to accommodate women
in small numbers only recently. 238 Aharoni was accused and convicted of
sexually harassing all three women who served with him, constantly subjecting
them to sexual remarks and propositions that created a hostile and demeaning
working environment in the unit along clearly gendered lines. However, the
court was extremely lenient with Aharoni. Employing the "moment of
weakness" rhetoric that surfaced in previous cases, the court described the
defendant as "a man who had a slip of the tongue against women who served
with him." 239 Furthermore, the court noted that the testimony of the
complainants made clear that verbal sexual harassment was common practice in
the unit.24° Hence, the fact that Aharoni's actions were part of, and a reflection
of, a larger culture of sexual harassment was held in his favor. The court also
referred to the solely verbal nature of the harassment, and to the fact the women
whom Aharoni harassed were not subordinate to him but were his coworkers.
The court regarded this too as a mitigating factor. The court also mentioned that
the probation officer did not perceive Aharoni as a potential sex offender.41
What the court could have easily identified as a typical pattern of hostile
environment sexual harassment of a small group of women in a traditionally
male-dominated military unit was decontextualized once the broader gender
hierarchies that characterized the situation were ignored. Neglecting to identify
the role the harassing behaviors played in preserving the masculine image of
that workplace and their relationship to the broader culture of harassment
against women that prevailed in that unit, the case was then presented as an
incidental matter of minor sexual misbehavior. The fact that Aharoni was not a
236. In this case, as in the supreme court case Levi, the appellate court did mention the fact that the
harassed woman had to quit her job, but refrained from explaining the meaning of this fact in the context
of the sexual harassment of working women and how and why it adds an important aspect to the analysis
and understanding of harm in such cases. See supra notes 180-190.
237. CrimC (Hi) 5977/01 Israel v. Aharoni [2005] Pador 05(7) 782.
238. Id.
239. CrimC (Hi) 5977/01 Israel v. Aharoni [2005] Pador 05(23) 840, 844.
240. Id. at 843.
241. Id. at 843-44.
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recidivist sex offender and that he was convicted not of physical but merely of
verbal harassment of those women-a practice that was widespread-justified
abandoning the criminal conviction and replacing it with a civil obligation of
community service.
242
The case of Josef Ben-Haim243 also dealt with incidents of sexual
harassment in a male-dominated workplace. Ben-Haim, a senior police officer,
was accused of sexually harassing a young woman who worked for a private
security company that assisted the police in securing the area of the Western
Wall in Jerusalem. The charge against Ben-Haim was that, during a night
mission with the complainant, he constantly touched her body, hugged her,
244pinched her cheeks, and so on. The court fully believed the testimony of the
complainant, and noted specifically:
The complainant, who started to work for the security company after
she finished her military service, testified coherently and [successfully]
faced a long and tortuous cross-examination. We are talking about a
reliable and serious young woman with high moral values who was
very upset by the [physical] contact the defendant initiated with her.
... In her testimony, she testified in great detail as to what happened
that day, and it was apparent that the event caused her a lot of pain.
245
However, the court acquitted the defendant, on the grounds that the
complainant had not made it clear to the defendant that his behavior was
unwelcome. In addition, it seemed more probable to the court that the
complainant, who was perceived as an overly-sensitive young woman, had
misattributed a sexual nature to the defendant's behavior toward her.
246
Summarizing the broader conclusions to be drawn from the event, the court
ended up justifying rather than condemning the exclusion of women from jobs
traditionally held by men:
The mission that was exercised after midnight in a dark, quiet and
mysterious area could cause any reasonable person, and especially a
young woman, [to be in a state of] suspicion and distress .... I believe
that using a young girl for such a mission in the late hours of the night
is clearly wrong, and the security forces should reconsider [this policy]
in the future. An exercise intended to assess the alertness of policemen
can be performed in a different way and without [the presence of] a
young woman who is not part of the police force.247
242. In certain criminal cases, the court has the discretion to mitigate the consequences of a
conviction before the defendant is sentenced by abandoning the criminal aspect of the conviction. This
prevents the creation of a criminal record for the defendant, and allows the court to impose a light
punishment such as community service. In the case of Aharoni, he was ordered by the court to serve 600
hours of community service and to pay 2000 Israeli Shekels to each of the three complainants.
243. CrimC 4944/04 (Jer) Israel v. Ben-Chaim [2006] Pador 06(9) 687.
244. Id. at * 1.
245. Id. at *8.
246. Id. at *9.
247. Id.
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Unlike the other cases dealing with incidents of sexual harassment in male-
dominated settings such as the military and the police, Ben-Haim added a
gendered perspective to the analysis. However, gender was integrated into the
discussion as a repository for a moralistic and patriarchal perception of women.
Concluding that the "real" problem in the case was the presence of young and
sensitive women in places where they do not belong, the court suggested
driving these women out of such non-traditional professional spheres, thereby
promoting one of the most adverse effects of sexual harassment in a male-
dominated setting.2 48 Thus, the Ben-Haim court, in its efforts to provide proper
protection for the specific female complainant, furthered her subordination
beyond the original crime, and reinforced the idea that women cannot meet the
demands of "a man's job."
An additional aspect of sexual harassment caselaw in the lower courts is
the ongoing emphasis on the "sexual" nature of sexual harassment, an emphasis
that completely ignores the full nature and various consequences of this social
practice. Here too we witness a growing gap between reality and the judicial
rhetoric analyzing and responding to this reality. Israel v. Fridenberg provides
an interesting example in this context. 249 This case involved an employer who
habitually made crude sexual remarks to one of his female employees. In
addition to these remarks, he subjected her to hostile comments of a non-sexual
but gender-stereotypical nature, such as "dummy," "retarded," "thickie," and
"you don't understand anything." 250 After one incident in which he also slapped
her, she filed a complaint with the police, and as a result she was fired. In this
case, much like Ben-David, the court had an opportunity to promote a broader
understanding of the complex nature of harassment that women are subjected
to. It might have highlighted the distinction between "sex-based harassment"
and "gender-based harassment," 251 and brought into question the prevailing
judicial conclusion that "behavior will not be considered sexual harassment,
even if it is harassing, if it is not of a sexual nature or is [not] expressed in
matters associated with sex., 252 However, no such discussion took place, and
the case was characterized as another typical example in which the woman was
simply subjected to "repeated suggestions of a sexual nature." 253
248. Feminist literature on sexual harassment argues that the sexual harassment of working women
in predominantly masculine jobs serves as an effective tool for driving them out of those prestigious
jobs. See MACKINNON, supra note 68, at 143-213.
249. CrimC 2334/02 Israel v. Fridenberg [2003] (unreported case).
250. Id.
251. Schultz, supra note 129, at 1744.
252. CSA 6713/96 Israel v. Ben-Asher [1998] lsrSC 52(1) 650, 654.
253. CrimC (RL) 2334/02 Israel v. Fridenberg [2003] (unreported case).
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IV. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: BETWEEN THE LIMITS OF LAW AND THE
LIMITS OF FEMINISM
More than nine years after its enactment, the Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law has contributed to a higher degree of enforcement than existed
under former sexual harassment legislation in Israel. It has created an easily
implemented legal framework for prosecutors and judges, and has produced a
substantial body of opinions that have not only imposed personal liability on
persons charged with sexual harassment, but also stressed the importance of
eradicating this social practice.
However, as shown in Part III of this Article, contemporary judicial
conceptualization of sexual harassment and its harms, as confined to the
boundaries of the dignitary paradigm that was integrated into the new
legislation, has suffered from several defects. This paradigm created a line of
demarcation between sexual harassment and sex discrimination, such that
sexual harassment is no longer discussed in terms that associate it with gender
inequality and highlight its discriminatory aspects. Rather, the exclusive focus
on dignity has diverted the judicial discussion of sexual harassment to a few
distinct rhetorical avenues that each hinder the battle against sexual harassment
in a different manner.
This process, in which the courts have reconstructed the Prevention of
Sexual Harassment Law in terms that are very distant from the original goals of
its feminist proponents, appears to be the product of three crucial choices made
by those who drafted the new legislation. The first was the decision to list
gender equality as the last of several values that were declared relevant for the
analysis of sexual harassment. The second decision, which immediately
followed the first, was the decision to award a special and primary role to
human dignity (or kavod) as the central normative frame of reference for the
definition of the wrong of sexual harassment. These two choices led to the
conscious drafting of section 1 of the law, which provides, "The objective of
this Law is to prohibit sexual harassment, in order to protect human dignity,
liberty and privacy and in order to promote equality between the sexes." 254 The
third crucial choice in this context was the decision to criminalize sexual
harassment in a manner that associated it with other sex offenses such as
indecent behavior.
The immediate implications of all those choices are evident in the judicial
opinions that are discussed in Part III. While the feminist forces who promoted
the new legislation clearly articulated their intentions regarding the proper
interpretation of the law during the legislative deliberation, they provided the
courts with a legal framework that was open to alternative interpretations. For
instance, the decision to present gender equality as supplementary rather than
254. Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1998, S.H. 166 § 1.
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as the sole defining value of the wrong of sexual harassment created a different
dynamic than the drafters may have expected. While feminist actors were
trying to promote a broad and diversified understanding of sexual harassment
that preserved a close tie between dignity and equality, the courts simply
replaced equality with dignity. Once presented with an assembly of values that
all define the harm of sexual harassment, Israeli courts were no longer required
to understand the possible nexus between sexual harassment and gender
inequality. Contrary to American courts, which must struggle with the question
of why sexual harassment constitutes gender discrimination, Israeli courts were
offered an easier option: to link sexual harassment to a well-established value
such as dignity (kavod) that also tied in with their common-sense
understandings. Once kavod became the sole focus of court opinions dealing
with sexual harassment, it turned out that there was more than one
understanding of the dignitary harm of sexual harassment. The multiple
meanings embedded in the term kavod opened the door to various
interpretations of the dignitary paradigm of sexual harassment ranging from
traditional and often patriarchal perceptions of women's honor to the more
liberal yet highly individual and gender-neutral value of human dignity. This
multiplicity of meanings inherent to the term kavod created a genuine
normative ambiguity as to what constitutes sexual harassment.
Finally, the decision to criminalize sexual harassment in a manner that
coupled all forms of sexual harassment with certain sex offenses such as
"indecent behavior" also brought unexpected consequences. This linkage
between sexual harassment and sex offenses signaled behavior of a sexual
nature as an important feature of the new legislation, and provided implicit
support for the Israeli Supreme Court's immediate focus on the "sexual" in
sexual harassment. Furthermore, the association of sexual harassment with
sexual behavior allowed a moralistic conceptualization to dominate the
dignitary harm of harassment. Once sexual harassment was reduced to sex, and
the dignity/honor paradigm of the law made it possible to divert the discussion
of harm to women's honor, a moralistic conclusion regarding the manner in
which sex offends women's honor could find support in the general framework
of the law.
In addition, it is important to remember that criminal discourse focuses on
questions of guilt at the individual level, since the very concept of personal
guilt stands at the core of criminal liability, while equality is not a value that is
usually promoted or defended through criminal law. These features of criminal
law can explain the gender-neutral/individual conceptualization of sexual
harassment that characterizes one of the court's themes of analysis. This theme,
when exercised as part of the criminal discussion of guilt and harm, confines
the discussion to the particular harasser and the individual humiliation of his or
her victim and excludes as irrelevant questions relating to the broader gendered
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context that allows the harassing behavior and intensifies its harm. Aharoni,
discussed above, illustrates this process and highlights its problematic
implications. 255 Aharoni was not alone in verbally harassing the three
policewomen in his male-dominated unit. Accordingly, the court determined
that verbal sexual harassment was the common practice in the unit. But while
this fact provided a clear example of the way in which women's full integration
in traditionally segregated jobs is hindered through repeated patterns of sexual
harassment, from the criminal perspective it was a mitigating factor with regard
to the individual criminal liability of Aharoni himself. Ultimately, it contributed
to the extremely light punishment---community service without a criminal
record-that the court handed down.
Hence, the linkage between sexual harassment and some specific sex
offenses undermined the development of sexual harassment caselaw in two
important respects. It provided implicit support for the court's focus on the
"sexual" in sexual harassment and its moralistic interpretation of the dignitary
harm of this social practice as relating to women's honor, and it restricted the
development of sexual harassment discourse within the special boundaries of
criminal law.
It appears, then, that the judicial interpretation of sexual harassment law in
Israel cannot be separated from the conscious choices made by those who
drafted the law, including its feminist proponents. Moreover, this interpretive
framework reflects a widening gap between the original rationale of the
feminist groups that promoted the dignitary paradigm of the new legislation
and the courts' subsequent interpretation and conceptualization of that
paradigm. The courts neglected and eventually ignored the feminist
proponents' original claim that sexual harassment mirrors and enhances
discrimination against women and their subordinated status in society. Instead,
judicial discourse on sexual harassment promotes a very limited and sometimes
misleading understanding regarding the nature, causes, and implications of this
practice, which impedes the struggle against sexual harassment in two
distinctive ways.
The neutral/individual interpretation of the dignitary harm of sexual
harassment silences questions and understandings regarding the gendered
aspects of this social phenomenon. The prevailing rhetoric of gender neutrality
hides the complex reality of gender hierarchy that underlies and facilitates
many situations of sexual harassment. As this Article reveals, the vast majority
of Israeli sexual harassment cases bear an unmistakably gendered significance.
The harasser in all reported cases I have identified is a man, the target is almost
always a woman (or several women in the same setting), and the predominant
255. CrimC (Hi) 5977/01 Israel v. Aharoni [2005] Pador 05(7) 782; see also supra notes 237-242
and accompanying text.
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context of the offense is power differences on clearly gendered lines.2" In this
respect, Israeli sexual harassment cases reveal the reality of gender
discrimination in the workplace, in education, and in the military, and serve as
a powerful reminder that sexual harassment is a group-based social problem
that involves clearly gendered harms.
Moreover, since the linkage between sexual harassment and gender
inequality draws on the actual life experiences of many women (and a few
men), experiences that are documented in hundreds of cases, the fact that Israeli
courts ignore and even actively disguise this linkage has real consequences for
women. By promoting a partial and at times false understanding of sexual
harassment, contemporary judicial discourse undermines possible solutions to
this problem. If sexual harassment is discussed and presented as the aberrant
conduct of genderless individuals that harms some other genderless individuals
with no group significance, a court ruling in a specific case involving incidents
of harassment becomes the only possible legal response to the problem. In
contrast, an alternative conclusion emerges if sexual harassment is understood
as one expression of the lower status of women in general and in the workplace
in particular, in the broader context of the unequal gender power relations that
produce and enable sexual harassment. It then becomes clear that a judicial
ruling in an individual case will never serve as an effective tool against sexual
harassment if it is not accompanied by broader legal measures that are designed
to promote greater gender equality, especially in the workplace. Thus, in its
current state sexual harassment caselaw discourages further legal action against
gender inequality in general and against sexual harassment in particular. In fact,
this caselaw obscures the relationship between the two. Instead of becoming an
educational, consciousness-raising tool that marks a new era in the awareness
of sexual harassment and its distinct nature and harm among the Israeli public,
the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law has achieved the opposite, hindering
the broader and more radical task it was envisioned to serve. By losing sight of
sex discrimination, sexual harassment law no longer serves as an effective tool
for changing society so that this social practice does not recur.
Additionally, the moralistic and patriarchal interpretation of the dignitary
harm of sexual harassment hinders the battle against sexual harassment in a
different and more devastating manner. This discourse stereotypes women in
terms that are at odds with basic precepts of gender equality, thereby creating a
body of caselaw that effectively undermines many of the rationales behind the
feminist battle against sexual harassment. By reviving traditional, patriarchal
concepts of women's honor, courts legitimate under the umbrella of feminist
legislation concepts that are clearly anti-feminist. The Ben-Haim case, 257 where
256. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
257. CrimC (Jet) 4944/04 Israel v. Ben-Chaim [2006] Pador 06(9) 687; see supra notes 243-248
and accompanying text.
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the court, in its efforts to protect sensitive women from the harms of sexual
behavior, eventually recommended sending them home, provides an extreme
example of the possible implications of a rhetoric that places women's
sensitivity and sexual purity, rather than their basic right to equality, at the
center of the dignitary paradigm of sexual harassment law.
CONCLUSION
How do you turn an agenda of social change into a working legal practice?
This question is at the core of the feminist struggle against sexual harassment.
The dignitary paradigm of sexual harassment law represents an additional stage
in this ongoing effort to recruit the law as an effective agent in combating and
condemning a social phenomenon that is perceived as particularly harmful to
women. However, the actual products of the Israeli Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law highlight the difficulties associated with using the law as an
effective tool for social change.
Israeli sexual harassment legislation is the result of a carefully tailored and
highly ambitious feminist initiative, which was designed to reconceptualize
sexual harassment law in a manner that would make this legislation more
effective in combating a problem that harms mostly women. In defending this
initiative and especially in promoting a conceptual shift from an equality-based
statute to a dignity-based statute, Israeli feminists emphasized several goals.
The most challenging goal was the desire to correct some of the drawbacks of
sexual harassment legal doctrine in the United States. Following the American
example, Israeli feminists worried that the judicial notion of formal equality,
which is intertwined with patriarchal ideology, might restrict the development
of sexual harassment law in Israel as it did in the United States. They therefore
suggested redefining sexual harassment as primarily a dignitary harm, hoping
to cure the male-biased interpretation of equality by focusing the discussion of
sexual harassment on a different value that appeared to them as less patriarchal.
However, Israeli feminists did not fully grasp the broader implications of their
own substantive critique regarding the patriarchal aspects of the judge-made
concept of formal equality. While they argued critically that a male focus set
the standard of equality in law, they did not further question their own decision
to bolster equality with dignity as a proper solution to the problem. Following
their own critique of the law, Israeli feminists could have wondered whether a
formal shift from one legal value to another would relieve the law from its
inherent gender entanglements. Those doubts should have been raised-
especially with regard to an ambiguous value such as dignity (or kavod) that
embodies a number of meanings and concepts, some of them highly susceptible
to traditional and patriarchal interpretations. In fact, the actual products of
contemporary sexual harassment caselaw, which range from a genderless
[Vol. 19:391
Stereotyping Women, Individualizing Harassment
interpretation of sexual harassment to a stereotyping discourse on women and
gender, suggest that the male bias is still deeply embedded in legal discourse
and therefore similarly shapes the interpretation of the dignitary paradigm of
sexual harassment.
In addition, Israeli feminists neglected to appreciate the significance of the
fact that American courts have defined sexual harassment as a subset of
employment discrimination. By categorizing behavior in particular terms and
not others, laws provide a cognitive structure for understanding social behavior.
By defining sexual harassment as sex-based discrimination, American courts
have affirmed feminists' arguments that sexual harassment is a group-defined
injury in employment. Even if the American courts did not fully comprehend
MacKinnon's subordination argument, this legal categorization of sexual
harassment privileged a gendered understanding of sexual harassment that is
crucial in light of the actual characteristics of the social practice.
For Israeli feminists, then, as for all other advocates of the dignitary
paradigm of sexual harassment, the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law
raises important questions regarding law's potential to serve as an effective
bridge between radical agendas and existing social norms.
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